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The Scope of Mediator Immunity: When Mediators
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I. INTRODUCTION
Mediation, an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) technique, uses a
neutral third party to facilitate dispute resolution. Mediators provide
disputants with a nonbinding assessment of their case to explore and
promote settlement options. 1 In the United States, mediation has been
implemented at both the federal 2 and state3 levels, either as an adjunct to
court proceedings or by contract outside ofjudicial supervision.
As courts increasingly turn to mediators, 4 the need to protect
participants in the mediation process has become evident. How to protect
such participants has raised many issues, 5 including the nature and scope of
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1 For articles discussing the range of functions increasingly being assumed by mediators,
see Note, The Sultans of Swap: Defining the Dtties and Liabilities of American Mediators, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1876 (1986); Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of
Barriers to the Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 235, 248-249 (1993).
2 See infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 183-187 and accompanying text. See also infra Appendix E.
4 See Note, Mandatory Mediation and Summary Jury Trial: Guidelines for Ensuring Fair
and Effective Processes, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1086, 1090-1095 (1990).
5 See generally Alan Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege's Transition from Theory to
Implementation: Designing a Mediation Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation Participants,
the Process and the Public Interest, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 1; John B. Lewis & Lois J. Cole,
Defamation Actions Arising from Arbitration and Related Dispute Resolution Procedures-
Preemption, Collateral Estoppel and Privilege: Why the Absolute Privilege Should be
Expanded, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 677 (1996).
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confidentiality protections for the participants6 and immunity for the
neutrals before whom these disputes are presented. Perhaps none is so
vexing as the evolving area of whether mediators should be granted some
degree of immunity for the services they render, particularly if the mediator
is compensated. 7
Possible claims8 against a mediator include the following: violations of
constitutional rights, tort actions alleging the negligent performance of
duties, intentional tortious interference with contractual relationships,
breach of contract, conflicts of interest, breach of fiduciary duty, actions
asserting defamation claims, 9 violations of the Deceptive Trade and
Practices Act (DTPA) and civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C.
section 1983. Imposing liability on mediators under traditional tort notions
would focus on the elements of proximate causation and harm. In the case
of compensated mediators, who have been selected because they are
professionals and have charged their usual rates, harm can be measured by
the amount of the fee.10 One commentator suggests that consumers of
compensated mediator services can assert claims for breach of contract or
for violation of the DTPA. 11 Another possible remedy for mediator
6 See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, No. V (American Bar
Association, Sections on Litigation and Dispute Resolution; American Arbitration Association;
and Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution) [hereinafter MODEL STANDARD]; Brian
Dorini, Case Comment, Institutionalizing ADR: Wagshal v. Foster and Mediator Immunity, 1
HARv. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 185, 180-191 (1996) (discussing confidentiality standards
applicable to court-annexed mediations in various federal courts); Michael A. Perino, Drafting
Mediation Privileges: Lessons from the Civil Justice Refonn Act, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1
(1995); Kirtley, supra note 5, at 8-9; Irene S. Said, The Mediator's Dilemma: The Legal
Requirements Exception to Confidentiality under the Texas ADR Statute, 36 S. TEx. L. REv.
579 (1995); Eric R. Max, Confidentiality in Environmental Mediation, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.
J. 210 (1993); Kevin Gibson, Confidentiality in Mediation: A Moral Reassessment, 1992 J.
DISP. RESOL. 25; Note, Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 441
(1984).
7 MODEL STANDARD, NO. VIII sets forth factors to guide mediators in setting fees for
mediation services. See MODEL STANDARD NO. VIII.
8 Even when liability can be established, damages may be difficult to measure,
particularly when the claim is premised on noncompliance with mediation procedures. At the
very least, the plaintiff must establish proximate causation between the alleged injury and the
mediator's conduct. See generally NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. MCEWEN, MEDIATION:
LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE § 11.03 (1989); KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICE 219-220 (1994).
9 See Lewis & Cole, supra note 5, at 678-679.
10 See Note, supra note 1, at 1891-1894.
11 See KOVACH, supra note 8, at 219.
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misconduct is rescission of the resulting settlement agreement because the
parties' assent was not properly obtained. 12
This Article assesses the availability and scope of mediator immunity
and whether immunity is needed to protect the mediation process.
Paramount is the need to determine whether mediators can invoke immunity
from claims for acts or omissions incident to their service. If mediators
could invoke immunity, such immunity would extend to claims sounding in
contract and tort; 13 but would it also encompass intentional torts or criminal
conduct by the mediator, such as fraud or extortion? Do mediators need the
protections provided by absolute judicial or quasi-judicial immunity or is
qualified immunity sufficient? Given the implementation of mediation
programs by courts around the country that authorize private individuals to
serve as compensated mediators, a related issue is whether different
standards for assessing mediator conduct should be applied to compensated
mediators. 14
Commentators disagree on whether court-appointed mediators should
be entitled to judicial1 5 immunity or qualified immunity. Proponents of
immunity maintain that it must be provided to mediators to encourage the
availability of third party neutrals and to control costs. 16 Opponents assert
that granting immunity to mediators denies litigants adequate recourse when
12 See Note, supra note 1, at 1895.
13 See Margaret G. Farrell, Coping with Scientific Evidence: The Use of Special
Masters, 43 EMoRY L.J. 927, 980-982 (1994).
14 If compensated, another issue is whether a court-appointed mediator should be paid
according to a standard for mediators generally or according to their nonmediation
professional levels, for example, as an attorney, accountant or investment banker. This issue
is not addressed further in this article because it has not yet been addressed by the courts, but
the author believes that courts will have to address it as fee applications are presented by
compensated mediators to courts which have approved their retention. This issue will
unquestionably be raised in the bankruptcy courts, which are required by statute to approve all
fee applications of professionals rendering services to the bankruptcy estate. See II U.S.C. §
330 (1994). See also infra note 24 and accompanying text.
15 Judicial immunity is also called "absolute" immunity. See infra notes 32-61 and
accompanying text. When extended to participants in the judicial process who are not judges,
it is described as "quasi-judicial" immunity.
16 See generally Joseph B. Stulberg, Mediator Immunity, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL.
85 (1986); D. Alan Rudlin & Kelly L. Faglioni, Mediator Immunity Promotes ADR Access,
Keeps Cost Low, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 11, 1994, at C12. Additional mechanisms available to
protect the public from incompetent mediators include qualification standards, ethical
standards, particularly if accompanied by enforcement mechanisms, and court supervision in
court-connected mediation. See id.
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incompetent services have been rendered. 17 As an alternative to granting
immunity, the dissenters argue that the same goals can be achieved by
providing insurance to mediators through either the mediation program's
sponsor or a group rate made available to individual mediators.18
To illustrate the role of court-appointed mediators, this Article
discusses the order providing for mediation promulgated by the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. 19 Using the
Order as a paradigm, this Article will analyze the availability and scope of
immunity for mediators. It will survey the case law evolution of immunity
doctrines and the scope of protection they provide. Next, this Article will
discuss federal and state statutes and administrative regulations that
authorize the use of mediation as an ADR option and the extent to which, if
at all, they provide for mediator immunity. This Article will assess the
scope of protection current for mediators who serve under the Order,
particularly when the mediators are compensated for their services. The
Author concludes that both compensated and noncompensated mediators
serving in court-sponsored mediation programs should be granted absolute
quasi-judicial immunity for services rendered within the scope of their
engagement.
17 The most significant institutional dissenter is the Center of Dispute Settlement and the
Institute of Judicial Administration. See NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR COURT-CONNECTED
MEDIATION PROGRAMS (Center of Dispute Settlement and the Institute of Judicial
Administration) (1992). Other commentators also espouse mediator liability. See, e.g., Note,
supra note 4, at 1099; J. Sue Richardson, Mediation: The Florida Legislature Grants Judicial
Immunity to Court-Appointed Mediators, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 623, 628 (1990); Arthur A.
Chaykin, The Liabilities and Immunities of Mediators: A Hostile Environment for Model
Legislation, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. REsOL. 47 (1986); Linda R. Singer, Immunity Imperils
the Public and Mediator Professionalism, NAT'L L.J., Apr. I1, 1994, at C12.
18 Kimberlee Kovach Comments:
At the end of 1993, a primary insurer of arbitrators and mediators [Complete Equity
Markets, Inc.] reported that the current number of claims against mediators and
arbitrators averages five per year. The majority of these involved either general
negligence, conflicts of interest, or breaches of confidentiality. The remaining were
divided among other theories of liability [based on telephone interview in early 19941."
KOVACH, supra note 8, at 219.
19 See In re Adoption of Procedures Governing Mediation of Matters in Bankruptcy
Cases and Advisory Proceedings, General Order N-I17 of the Court (S.D.N.Y. Nov.10,
1993.) [hereinafter Order]. See infra Appendix A.
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II. MEDIATION PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY
COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Bankruptcy courts are increasingly appointing compensated mediators
to facilitate and expedite the bankruptcy process. 20 In 1993, a mediation
program was instituted by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York by General Order 117 of the Court (Order).
The Order established an out-of-court mediation program in bankruptcy
cases and adversary proceedings before the court, excluding matters
involving a governmental unit. It also provided procedural guidance for the
court's Program.
Pursuant to the Order, a matter may be assigned to the Program by the
court upon its own motion or upon a motion by any party in interest or the
Trustee in Bankruptcy.2 1 The mediator to whom the matter is assigned must
meet certain qualifications and be registered with the Clerk of the Court.22
Although the Order authorizes compensation for mediators, terms are to be
negotiated between the parties and the mediator.23 Mediator fees to be paid
by a bankruptcy estate require court approval. 24 The Order does not make
clear what protections, if any, are available to mediators, whether
compensated or not, sued for actions taken in that capacity. Possible
solutions to this issue include the following: (1) an amendment to the Order
clarifying the right to legal representation for mediators acting within the
scope of their authority and stating that mediator immunity exists, and (2) a
couit-sponsored insurance program. 25
20 See'Hon. Nancy F. Atlas, Mediation in Bankruptcy Cases, Part 1, 6 PRAC. LAW. 39
(1995); Hon. Nancy F. Atlas, Mediation in Bankruptcy Cases, Part 2, 7 PRAc. LAw 63
(1995); Ralph R. Mabey et al., Symposium on Bankruptcy, Expanding the Reach of
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Bankruptcy: The Legal and Practical Bases for the Use of
Mediation and the Other Forns of ADR, 46 S. C. L. REV. 1259 (1995); Robert E. Nies, ADR
Fosters Kinder, Gentler Bankruptcies, 139 N.J.L.J. 182 (January 16, 1995).
21 See Order, § 1.1.
22 See Order, § 2.1(A).
23 See Order, § 4.0.
24 See id.
25 This solution was proposed by the New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on Dispute
Resolution as part of its report, which concluded that mediators should not be granted
immunity. Task Force Report, New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on Complementary
Dispute Resolution, 124 N.J.L.J. 90, 96 (July 13, 1989); Final Report 23-24 (1990).
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III. SOURCES OF PROTECTION
Courts, legislatures and administrative bodies have recognized mediatorimmunity, premised on doctrines of either judicial or quasi-judicial absolute
immunity for judicial acts. Interestingly, although some commentators
argue that qualified immunity sufficiently protects mediators, 26 all the
courts that have considered the issue to date have insulated mediators from
liability on the basis of absolute immunity. This section reviews the theories
used to establish the availability and scope of that immunity.
A. Immunity Doctrines in the Courts
Doctrines of immunity initially evolved in the federal courts through a
large number of Supreme Court decisions that established either judicial or
quasi-judicial absolute immunity for judicial acts. 27 More contemporary
decisions on immunity have been rendered by the circuit courts. A recent
decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled
expressly that mediators serving without compensation in a court-sponsored
program have judicial immunity. 28 In a case involving arbitrators, the
Second Circuit granted immunity to participants in judicial and quasi-
judicial proceedings. 29 Decisions in other circuits have been similarly
helpful.30 This Article will analyze these decisions and their historic
2 6See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
2 7See infra notes 32-114 and accompanying text.
2 8See Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1994), ceri. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1314
(1995). The Wagshal case is discussed infra at notes 116-128 and accompanying text.
2 9See Austern v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., 898 F.2d 882, 886 (2d Cir. 1990). The
Austem case is discussed infra at notes 129-133 and accompanying text.
30 See e.g., Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1978); Slotnick v. Garfinkle,
632 F.2d 163, 166 (1st Cir. 1980); Bettencourt v. Board of Registration, 904 F.2d 772, 781-
785 (Ist Cir. 1990); Williams v. Wood, 612 F. 2d 982, 985 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam);
Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1012-1013 (5th Cir. 1981); Folsom Inv. Co. v. Moore, 681
F.2d 1032, 1097-1098 (5th Cir. 1982); Austin Mun. Sec. v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers,
757 F.2d 676, 679 (5th Cir. 1985); Denman v. Leedy, 479 F. 2d 1097, 1098 (6th Cir. 1973)
(per curiam); UAW v. Greyhound Lines, 701 F.2d 1181, 1185-1188 (6th Cir. 1983). Duncan
v. Peck, 844 F.2d 1261, 1263-1264 (6th Cir. 1988); Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 844 (6th
Cir. 1994); Del's Big Saver Foods v. Carpenter Cook, Inc., 795 F.2d 1344, 1351 (7th Cir.
1986); Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 600-601 (7th Cir. 1992); Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d
844, 850-851 (8th Cir. 1983); Watertown Equip. Co. v. Norwest Bank Watertown, 830 F.2d
1487, 1489-1496 (8th Cir. 1987); Patterson v. Von Riesen, 999 F.2d 1235, 1236 (8th Cir.
1993); Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 385 n.10 (9th Cir. 1983); Sharma v. Stevas, 790
F.2d 1486, 1486 (9th Cir. 1986); Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 1138-1140
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underpinnings.
In state court actions, quasi-judicial immunity has been extended to
mediators, conciliators and other neutrals who conduct ADR procedures
voluntarily and not in a court-mandated situation. State court decisions have
upheld the immunity of such ADR neutrals, even if selected and
compensated by the disputants and not supervised in any way by the court.
In so doing, one court focused on the role that the mediators played in the
adjudicative process. It reasoned that granting mediators quasi-judicial
immunity supported the further implementation of ADR services as an
adjunct to judicial procedures. 3 1
1. Judicial and Quasi-judicial Common Law Immunity
At common law,32 absolute immunity was granted to participants in the
judicial process to protect that process from the harassment and intimidation
associated with litigation. The defense of judicial immunity is available
based on a functional analysis of the conduct challenged. Judicial officers
are granted absolute immunity for acts within their judicial capacity and
subject matter jurisdiction, even if erroneous. 33 In contrast, violations of
ministerial or administrative duties are not protected. 34 Whether an act is
(9th Cir. 1986); Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1394 (9th Cir.
1987); Coverdell v. Department of Social & Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 762-765 (9th Cir.
1987); Horwitz v. Board of Medical Examiners, 822 F.2d 1508, 1509 (10th Cir. 1987);
DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 844 F.2d 714, 716 (10th Cir. 1988);
Gregory v. United States, 942 F.2d 1498, 1500 (10th Cir. 1991); Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin,
808 F.2d 1435, 1440, vacated in part on other grounds, 822 F.2d 998, 1000, opinion
vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 833 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1987); Roland v. Phillips, 19
F.3d 552, 557 (1 1th Cir. 1994). For additional discussion of decisions involving quasi-judicial
immunity, see infra notes 39-47, 81 and accompanying text.
31 See Howard v. Drapkin, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893, 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (psychologist
performing dispute resolution services in connection with a lawsuit over custody and visitation
rights). LX. Lange v. Marshall, 622 S.W.2d 237, 238 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (decision not
based on immunity; court held that plaintiff did not establish damages proximately caused by
mediator's alleged negligence).
32 See generally J. Randolph Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of Judicial
Immunity, 1980 DuKE L.J. 879. For a discussion of Stump, see infra notes 45, 49, 51, 57 and
136 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 45-46, 57 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text; Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229
(1988) (regarding administrative acts). Judicial immunity does not protect executive and
legislative acts. See id. at 227; see also Mitchell v. Forsythe, 472 U.S. 511 (1985). The Court
explicitly excluded the promulgation of a code of conduct for attorneys, citing Supreme Court
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judicial or ministerial is determined by the nature of that act and the
expectations of the parties.
35
In 1872, the United States Supreme Court in Bradley v. Fisher36
extended the common law absolute immunity of state judges to federal
judges. 37 Such immunity is not limited to judges because "immunity is
justified and defined by the functions it protects and serves, not by the
person to whom it attaches." 38 In Yaselli v. Goff,3 9 absolute common law
immunity was extended to participants in the judicial process, including
judges, grand jurors, petit jurors, advocates and witnesses. Pretrial court
appearances by a prosecutor in a criminal action are also granted absolute
immunity.40
The Supreme Court has also granted quasi-judicial immunity to a
variety of persons who function in a manner comparable to judges or in an
adversarial context. A three-pronged test, first articulated in Butz v.
Economou,41 is applied to make that determination. First, the person
claiming immunity must function in a manner comparable to those
traditionally granted absolute immunity at common law. Second, it is
determined whether there is there a likelihood of harassment or intimidation
for performing those functions. Third, procedural safeguards must be in
of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, 446 U.S. 719 (1980). See Forrester, 484
U.S. at 228.
35 See Smith v. Martin, 542 F.2d 688, 690 (6th Cir. 1976) (providing absolute judicial
immunity for judge conducting settlement conference because the parties were under the
expectation that the judge dealt with them in a judicial capacity). See also infra notes 48-56
and accompanying text.
36 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872). According to one commentator, Bradley was the first
case to establish judicial immunity. See KovAcH, supra note 8, at 220 n.52.
37 Based on Bradley, such immunity was extended to arbitrators a few years later in a
state court decision because of the similarity of their functions. See Jones v. Brown, 6 N.W.
140, 143 (Iowa 1880).
38 Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988). For cases granting quasi-judicial
immunity to persons other than judges, see Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 509-512 (1978)
(granting immunity to executive branch officials performing administrative adjudication);
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20 (1976) (granting immunity to prosecutors and
grand jurors); Austin Municipal Secretary v. National Association of Securities Dealers, 757
F.2d 676, 697 (5th Cir. 1985) (granting immunity to registered national securities association.
its disciplinary officers and staff when functioning as prosecutors); and UA W v. Greyhound
Lines, 701 F.2d 1181, 1186 (6th Cir. 1983) (granting immunity to arbitrators).
39 12 F.2d 396, 396 (2d Cir. 1926), ald per curiam, 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
40 See Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492 (1991). See also Inbler, 424 U.S. at 431.
Imbler v. Pachtman is discussed infra at note 87.
41 438 U.S. 478, 513-517 (1978).
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place to protect against unconstitutional conduct. 42
The scope of the immunity provided is broad. False or defamatory
statements made in the course of or related to judicial proceedings are
entitled to absolute immunity. 43 Charges of malice or corruption are
protected by judicial immunity because they can be easily asserted, making
judges subject to vexatious litigation if they had to justify their motives. 44
Such litigation is fact-intensive. Because discovery is the only way to obtain
such facts, immunity is necessary to shield judges and the court system from
undue burden. Public policy requires that judges exercise their functions
with independence and without fear of consequences; errors should be
corrected through the appeals process. 45 As the Supreme Court stated in
Pierson v. Ray:
Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than
the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed
within their judicial jurisdiction, as this Court recognized when it
adopted the doctrine in Bradley v. Fisher .... This immunity applies
even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly,
and it "is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt
judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the
judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with
independence and without fear of consequences." It is a judge's duty
to decide all cases within his jurisdiction that are brought before him,
including controversial cases that arouse the most intense feelings in
the-litigants. His errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not
have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation
charging malice or corruption. Imposing such a burden on judges
would contribute not to principled and fearless decision-making but to
intimidation.46
42 For cases applying the three-pronged Butz test, see Simons v. Bellinger, 643 F.2d
774, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Horwitz v. Board of Medical Examiners, 822 F.2d 1508, 1513
(10th Cir. 1987); Bettencour v. Board of Registration, 904 F.2d 772, 783 (1st Cir. 1990);
Wagsha v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1252-1253 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
43 See Buris, 500 U.S. at 489.
44 See, e.g., Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 354 (1872); Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-357 (1978).
45 See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 553-554; Stump, 435 U.S. at 349; Mireles v. Waco, 502
U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam).
46 Pierson, 386 U.S. at 553-554 (citations omitted).
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Absolute judicial immunity also serves the goal of judicial efficiency by
protecting the finality of judgments. 47
Immunity can be either absolute or qualified. Absolute judicial
immunity evolved to protect discretionary decisionmaking by judges.48 A
two-tiered test is used based on the nature of the act and the expectations of
the parties. 49 An act is judicial if it is a function normally performed by a
judge, within the scope of her jurisdiction and requires the exercise of
judgment and discretion or is committed under a court's directive to assist
in the performance of a judicial act. 50 The plaintiff has the burden of
establishing that the judge knowingly acted without subject matter
jurisdiction. 51 That test is balanced by assessing the expectations of the
parties to determine whether they dealt with the judge in her judicial
capacity. 52 What is critical is "performance of the function of resolving
disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights." 53
47 See Jay M. Feinman & Roy S. Cohen, Suing Judges: History and Theory, 31 S.C. L.
RLv. 201, 266 (1980); Richardson, supra note 17, at 628.
48 See, e.g., Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 354 (1872); Pierson, 386 U.S.
at 553-554; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427-428; Butz, 438 U.S. at 508.
49 See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12 (per curiam); Stump, 435 U.S. at 362 ("[W]hether an act
by a judge is a 'judicial' one relate[s) to the nature of the act itself. i.e., whether it is a
function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties. i.e.. whether
they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.-).
5 0 See, e.g., Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429. 435-436 (1993)
(holding court reporters not entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity); Butz, 438 U.S. at
511-513 (1978) (holding adjudicatory functions within a federal agency entitled to immunity);
Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388-1391 (9th
Cir. 1987) (granting judicial or quasi-judicial immunity to bankruptcy judges, clerks and
Chapter 7 trustees); Sharma v. Stevas, 790 F.2d 1486, 1486 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding absolute
quasi-judicial immunity for Clerk of the United States Supreme Court under FTCA because
his acts were an integral part of the judicial process); Williams v. Wood, 612 F. 2d 982, 985
(5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (granting absolute judicial immunity for conduct ordered by
judicial decree or instructions); Denman v. Leedy, 479 F. 2d 1097, 1098 (6th Cir. 1973) (per
curiam) (granting immunity to clerk fixing bail because such conduct is within the scope of
official quasi-judicial duties).
51 See Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-357.
52 See Mireless, 502 U.S. at 12; Stump, 435 U.S. at 349.
53 Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 500 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), quoted with approval in Antoine, 508 U.S. at 433-434 n.8. See also Smith
v. Martin, 542 F.2d 688, 690 (6th Cir. 1976) (providing absolute judicial immunity for judge
conducting settlement conference because the parties were under the expectation that the judge
dealt with them in a judicial capacity).
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The conduct must be "closely associated with the judicial process."54
Conduct meeting those tests is judicial or quasi-judicial and entitled to
absolute immunity. By comparison, an act is ministerial where the law
defines and prescribes the duties to be performed with such precision and
certainty as to eliminate the exercise of discretion or judgment. 55 In Antoine
v. Byers & Anderson,56 a recent Supreme Court decision, court reporters
were held not to be entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity because they
exercise no discretion.
Absolute judicial immunity shields against all litigation alleging
misconduct, even against claims of malice or error.57 Criminal liability is
not protected. 58 Injunctive relief can also be obtained. 59 But judicial
immunity does not vitiate the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers. In Pulliam v. Allen, 60 the Supreme Court held that judicial
immunity does not insulate a judge from liability for attorney's fees
authorized by statute.61
Qualified immunity evolved as courts sought to circumscribe the
availability of judicial immunity. The presumption is that qualified
immunity sufficiently protects government officials exercising their duties. 62
54 Burns, 500 U.S. at 495 (allowing for prosecutorial immunity); see also Rutz, 438
U.S. at 511-513 (adjudicatory functions within a federal agency).
55 See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (holding that state court judge
acted in administrative capacity when he demoted and discharged a female probation officer);
Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12-13 (1991) (per curiam) (granting absolute immunity to
judge who committed judicial error by directing police officers forcibly to bring counsel in a
pending case before the court because the nature of the order was judicial).
56 508 U.S. at 436. Antoine was the basis for the decision by the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia in Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d. 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1994), in which the
court granted absolute immunity to a mediator. See infra notes 116-127 and accompanying
text.
57 See, e.g., Mireless, 502 U.S. at 13; Stump, 435 U.S. at 356; Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
58 See Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348-349 (1880).
59 See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 536-543 (1984).
60 id.
61 See id. at 543-544. The statute was 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pulliam was a five to four
decision and provoked a strong dissent from Justice Powell, who was concerned about the
impact of the majority's holding on judicial immunity. Although Pulliam can be read narrowly
as a statutory exception to common law judicial immunity, given the reliance of recent
immunity decisions on §1983, it carves out a powerful exception. For a discussion of the case
law on immunity under §1983, see infra notes 75-110 and accompanying text.
62 "The presumption is that qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to
protect government officials in the exercise of their duties. We have been 'quite sparing' in
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In Scheuer v. Rhodes,63 the Supreme Court defined qualified immunity in
terms of a subjective standard: "It is the existence of reasonable grounds for
the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with
good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive
officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct." 64 Such
immunity extends to erroneous acts or acts in excess of authority. 65 Unlike
absolute judicial immunity, it does not protect against bad faith, malice or
corruption. 66 Nor does it shield officials from plenary litigation to
determine whether they had, in fact, acted in good faith.67
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,68 the Supreme Court reassessed the standards
applicable to the qualified immunity defense. The common law subjective
standard was replaced with an objective one which imposed liability on
officials who violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known." 69 Thus, in Mitchell v.
Forsyth,70 the Supreme Court applied Butz v. Economou7l and held that the
Attorney General was only entitled to qualified immunity when performing
national security functions. 72
Reliance on the objective standard defined in Harlow allows
insubstantial claims to be dismissed by way of summary judgment motion. 73
our recognition of absolute immunity." Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988). But the
Court has refused to extend it any "further than its justification would warrant." Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 811 (1982). See also Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 487 (1991).
63 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
64 Id. at 247-248.
65 See id. at 242.
66 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 800; Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1993),
cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 929 (1995) (holding that qualified immunity is available to the
Directors of the Bureau of Prisons and Public Affairs at the Department of Justice against
allegations by prison inmate that they denied him access to the press and due process of law).
67 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976). But see Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
68 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
6 9 Id. at 818.
70 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
71 438 U.S. 478 (1978). See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
72 Other cases also granted qualified immunity based on functions performed. See, e.g.,
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (granting immunity to prosecutor performing
investigative functions); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985) (granting immunity to
prison discipline committee functioning as hearing officers); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308 (1975) (granting immunity to school board members performing legislative and
adjudicative functions).
73 See Malley v. Briggs; 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). See also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
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The Court stated in Imbler:
The procedural difference between the absolute and the qualified
immunities is important. An absolute immunity defeats a suit at the
outset, so long as the official's actions were within the scope of the
immunity. The fate of an official with qualified immunity depends
upon the circumstances and motivations of his actions, as established
by the evidence at trial.74
2. Cases under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
Recent Supreme Court precedents have made section 198375 the
primary source of litigation against governmental or quasi-governmental
officials. This section grants jurisdiction to federal courts to hear claims
against state officials for alleged violations of constitutional rights, and by
virtue of the Bivens doctrine, employees and agents of the federal
government. 76 Due to the Supreme Court's holdings in Dennis v. Sparks77
and Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,78 actions against mediators under the
program mediation instituted by the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York will most likely be based on section 1983. How and
why the Supreme Court's position evolved to favor granting immunity on
the basis of section 1983 is discussed in this subsection.
Nothing in the language of section 1983 indicates that governmental
employees or private parties can invoke immunity doctrines. 79 Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court has recognized substantive doctrines of privilege and
immunity in a wide variety of cases brought under section 1983.80
Immunity from section 1983 liability is premised on two mutually
dependent rationales: (1) the need to protect the exercise of discretion by
officials in the performance of their duties; and (2) the benefit to the public
of having officials exercise their judgment in good faith and act decisively
without fear of personal liability. 81
U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
74 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976).
75 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
76 For purposes of immunity, courts do not have to distinguish between § 1983 actions
brought against sate officials and Bivens actions brought against federal officials. This
doctrine is derived from Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971). See Butz, 438 U.S. at 503-504.
77 449 U.S. 24, 29 (1980). For discussion of this case, see infra notes 94-98 and
accompanying text.
78 457 U.S. 922 (1982). See discussion infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
79 Section 1983 "creates a species of tort liability that on its face admits of no
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Asserting a section 1983 claim does not constitute an election of
remedies. Such claims coexist with relief based on common law immunities
because the latter were not abrogated or abolished by the enactment of
section 1983.82 Courts faced with this issue have consistently held that
Congress did not state a clear intention to abolish the well-established
common law doctrines of judicial and legislative immunity.83
Immunity under section 1983 can be either absolute or qualified, using
the same functional criteria as under the common law. 84 The analysis starts
with an inquiry into whether the particular actor engaging in the conduct
complained of was insulated at common law.8 5 Absolute immunity under
section 1983 has been recognized for legislators and judges acting in their
official capacity86 and has been extended to prosecutors and witnesses. 87
Public defenders, on the other hand, have not been granted absolute
immunity from section 1983 claims. 88 Nor are judicial officers shielded
from liability for either attorney's fees awarded to a successful litigant
under section 1983 or from injunctive relief.89
immunities." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976). See also Malley v. Briggs, 475
U.S. 342, 342 (1986) (stating that § 1983, on its face, creates no immunity).
80 Section 1983 claims have been permitted against municipalities for the commission of
constitutional torts pursuant to official municipal policy. See Monell v. Department of Soc.
Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), ovemding Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See
also City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981) (holding that a municipality
is immune from punitive damages for the bad faith of its officials).
81 See, e.g., Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842 (6th Cir. 1994); Roland v. Phillips, 19 F.3d
552 (11th Cir. 1994); Patterson v. Von Riesen, 999 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir. 1993); Kincaid v.
Vail, 969 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1992); Gregory v. United States, 942 F.2d 1498 (10th Cir.
1991); Coverdell v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1987);
Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1981); Slotnick v. Garfinkle, 632 F.2d 163 (1st Cir.
1980).
82 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). See Dennis v. Spark, 449 U.S. 24, 29 (1980); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951).
83 See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
84 See discussion supra notes 48-61 and accompanying text. See generally Mireles v.
Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985); Briscoe v. LaHue,
460 U.S. 325 (1983); Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc.,
446 U.S. 719 (1980); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409 (1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
85 See Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 493 (1991); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339-
340 (1986); Imbler, 424 U.S. at 421.
86 See Thompson v. Safety Council of S.W. La., 891 F. Supp. 306 (W.D. La. 1995),
and cases cited therein.
87 See Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 325 (granting immunity to police officer and lay witnesses);
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There are also procedural advantages to the assertion of a section 1983
claim. In a section 1983 suit, from a procedural perspective, absolute
immunity operates to defeat a claim at its outset. In contrast, qualified
immunity operates as an affirmative defense. It is sometimes also referred to
as the "good faith" defense.90
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,9 1 the Supreme Court redefined the standard
applicable to a public official's right to qualified immunity to one of
objective good faith. 92 Since Harlow, a public official does not have
immunity from suit under section 1983 if the court determines from
objectively derived criteria that the official knew or reasonably should have
known that his conduct violated clearly established statutory or
424 U.S. at 409 (granting immunity to prosecutors); Pierson, 386 U.S. at 547 (granting
immunity to judges); Tenney, 341 U.S. at 367 (granting immunity to legislators). Such
immunity does not extend to the investigative and administrative functions performed by a
public official. See Burns, 500 U.S. 478 (1991) (holding that state prosecutor had absolute
immunity from § 1983 liability for participating in probable cause hearing but not for giving
legal advice to police).
In Imbler, the Supreme Court stated that prosecutors who violate the civil rights of an
individual under color of law are subject to professional discipline or disbarment. See Imbler,
424 U.S. at 431 n.34. In contrast, performing investigative or administrative functions does
not invoke the checks and safeguards inherent in the judicial process. See id. at 431 n.33
(1976). Imbler has been extended to grant absolute prosecutorial immunity to individuals
appointed as special prosecutors in criminal cases. See Taylor v. Nichols, 558 F.2d 561 (10th
Cir. 1977); Voytko v. Ramada Inn of Atlantic City, 445 F. Supp. 315 (D.N.J. 1978).
88 See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984) (holding that public defenders are not
immune from liability under § 1983 for intentional misconduct allegedly resulting from
conspiratorial action with state officials to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights); John
v. Hurt, 489 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1973) (stating that qualified immunity is granted to public
defenders acting within the scope of their duties).
89 See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 536-544 (1984). See supra notes 60-61 and
accompanying text.
90 See infra cases cited at notes 91-110 and accompanying text.
91 457 U.S. 800 (1982). See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
92 See id. at 818 (granting immunity to White House aides); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511, 517 (1985) (granting immunity to former U.S. Attorney General); Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987) (granting immunity to FBI agent); Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (granting immunity to police officer). Cf. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 731 (1982) (granting absolute immunity to former President of the United States).
Prior to Harlow, courts had construed "good faith" as containing both objective and
subjective elements. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-248 (1974); Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-322 (1975). See also supra notes 63-67 and accompanying
text.
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constitutional rights. Earlier cases had used either this objective test or
imposed liability for actions taken with malicious intent, using a subjective
good faith standard. In Harlow, the Supreme Court held that this latter test
did not protect public officials from insubstantial claims. 93
Of more importance to the issue of mediator immunity is the evolution
of the Supreme Court's position on the availability of qualified immunity to
private parties. In 1980, the Supreme Court determined that a private party
could be sued for liability under section 1983 in Dennis v. Sparks.94 That
case involved an alleged conspiracy between a state judge and private
persons where the judge accepted a bribe to issue an injunction. 95 The Court
construed the "under color of" state law requirement of section 1983 as not
requiring that the defendant be an officer of the state. 96
From the perspective of determining the availability of immunity to
court-appointed mediators, what is perhaps more significant about the
Dennis case was that it rejected the notion of derivative immunity. The
Court specifically held that in a section 1983 action, a private party could
not derive immunity from the absolute immunity of the co-conspiring judge,
whose conduct was protected. 97 Nor was there a constitutionally based
privilege to immunize judges testifying about their conduct in third-party
litigation. 98 Therefore, one must conclude that in an action claiming damage
due to a mediator's acts in accordance with the Order, a mediator is not
cloaked with the judicial immunity of the Southern District of New York
bankruptcy judges simply by following the provisions of the Order.
Subsequently, in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., the Supreme Court held
that acting in concert with a government official is not necessary to impose
liability on a private person under section 1983. 99 The Court in Lugar, in a
93 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816-818. Qualified immunity was afforded to local police
officers who had acted "with good faith and probable cause" in making what was
subsequently determined to be a false arrest and imprisonment. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547 (1967). The test was refined in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-248 (1974), where
the Supreme Court held that qualified immunity protected officers of the executive branch
who had reasonable grounds for, and a good faith belief in, their discretion to act. A qualified
.good faith" immunity was applied to school officials in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,
322 (1975).
94 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980).
95 See Id. at 25-26.
96 See id. at 27.
97 See Id. at 28-29.
98 See id. at 30.
99 457 U.S. 922, 942 (1982) (holding that private party's joint participation with state
officials in seizure of disputed property pursuant to a procedurally defective state statute
constituted a § 1983 violation).
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footnote, explicitly chose not to rule on whether the qualified immunity
defense was available to private parties under section 1983.100 However, in
Wyatt v. Cole,10 1 the Supreme Court imposed limits on Lugar by holding
that private parties could not assert section 1983 Harlow immunity from
suits when acting under a state replevin, garnishment or attachment statute
subsequently declared unconstitutional. 102 In those limited circumstances,
"private parties hold no office requiring them to exercise discretion; nor are
they principally concerned with enhancing the public good." 10 3 Mediators
under the Program presumably would meet the two tests articulated in Wyatt
because they are appointed to exercise discretion for the public good. What
remains unresolved is whether the Wyatt tests would also protect
compensated mediators under the Program. A court might find that such
mediators act principally to earn fees and only indirectly to enhance the
public good.
Wyatt was remanded to determine whether the respondents "in invoking
the replevin statute, acted under color of state law within the meaning of
Lugar."104 The possibility that a good faith or probable cause defense may
be available to private parties was left open:
[W]e do not foreclose the possibility that private defendants faced
with § 1983 liability under Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., could be
entitled to an affirmative defense based on good faith and/or probable
cause or that § 1983 suits against private, rather than governmental,
parties could require plaintiffs to carry additional burdens. Because
those issues are not fairly before us, however, we leave them for
another day.' 0 5
The court in Wyatt reasoned: (1) qualified immunity for private parties had
no analogue at common law, and (2) the policy considerations of
encouraging the forthright execution of public responsibilities were not
present in private disputes. 106
In cases subsequent to Lugar, lower federal courts have split on
whether the qualified, good faith immunity defense is available to private
parties.10 7 Essentially, these cases have reasoned that the policy concerns
100 See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942 n.23.
101 504 U.S. 158 (1992).
102 See id. at 168-169.
103 Id. at 168.
104 Id. at 169.
105 Id. (citations omitted).
106 See id. at 163-168.
107 Compare Folsom Invest. Co. v. Moore, 681 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that
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that justify immunity for government officials do not apply to private
individuals. To circumvent Lugar, courts that have found good faith
immunity for private parties distinguish good faith immunity per se from
immunity determined by the interposition of a good faith defense. Per se
good faith immunity is based on an objective analysis and claims can often
be resolved at the pleading stage in an action. In contrast, a good faith
defense is based on subjective factors that, in turn, are based largely on the
facts of a particular case.108
In De Vargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 19 a job applicant
with a disability was twice denied employment with a government
contractor based on government regulations then in effect. The applicant
sued the corporation and certain of its employees, all of whom asserted a
qualified immunity defense. The Tenth Circuit held that private parties were
entitled to qualified immunity under section 1983, applying three tests:
(1) the private party must act in accordance with the duties imposed by
a contract with the governmental body;
(2) the private party must perform a governmental function; and
(3) the private party must be sued solely on the basis of those acts
performed pursuant to the contract. 1 10
qualified immunity defense from monetary liability to private party who did not know and
should not reasonably have known that state attachment statute which it had invoked was
unconstitutional) and De Vargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 844 F.2d 714 (10th
Cir. 1988) and Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1983) and Jones v. Preuit &
Mauldin, 808 F.2d 1435 (11th Cir. 1987), vacated in part on other grounds, 822 F.2d 998
(11th Cir. 1987) (en bane), opinion vacated and reh. "g granted, 833 F.2d 1436 (1 1th Cir.
1987) with Duncan v. Peck, 844 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir. 1988) and Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d
1 (1st Cir. 1978) and Juncker v. Tinney, 549 F. Supp. 574 (D. Md. 1982).
108 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (holding that subjective good faith is
generally a question of fact that cannot be resolved by motion for summary judgment); Buller,
706 F.2d at 844.
109 844 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1988).
110 See id. Other courts have extended qualified immunity to private individuals using
the De Vargas criteria. Lower courts have denied private parties qualified immunity when
they allegedly conspired with public officials to deny plaintiffs their constitutional rights. See
Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 385 n.10 (9th Cir. 1983); Downs, 574 F.2d at 15.
However, the qualified immunity defense has been held available to private party defendants
receiving the aid of public officials pursuant to attachment or garnishment statutes that may be
unconstitutional. See Jones, 808 F.2d at 1440-1442, vacated in part on other grounds, 822
F.2d 998 (11th Cir. 1987), opinion vacated and rehearing granted en banc, 833 F.2d 1436
(11th Cir. 1987); Watertown Equip. Co. v. Norwest Bank, 830 F.2d 1487 (8th Cir. 1987);
Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d 844, 850-852 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that private individual
who relies upon unconstitutional state garnishment procedure may assert qualified immunity
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Under this doctrine, qualified immunity should be granted when the
functions of a private party are comparable to those functions a
governmental employee would perform in the absence of a contract with
that private party.
Mediators under the Program would likely be sued under section 1983,
given the well-developed body of case law in this area and the statutory
authorization for an award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in most
circumstances. What is clear from the cases discussed in this section is that
mediators at the least will be able to use a good faith defense, even if good
faith immunity is not available. If the Order is viewed as being equivalent to
a "contract" with a governmental body, mediators appointed by the court
would then be able to assert at least qualified immunity for rendering
mediation services thereunder. Support comes from De Vargas because the
private parties who enter into government contracts similar to those
described in that case are presumably compensated. The three criteria
articulated in De Vargas should also protect court-appointed but privately
compensated mediators under the Order. The rebuttal position, however,
would (1) note that mediation is not part of the existing dispute resolution
process provided for by the Constitution or Congress'11 and (2) analyze the
extent of discretion a mediator has in formulating his settlement
recommendation. From that perspective, it can be argued that the duties of
such mediators are not sufficiently controlled by a governmental entity
despite being trained and supervised by the court.
defense); Folsom Inv. Co., 681 F.2d at 1037-1038 (holding that private party who relies on
presumptively valid state attachment statute may claim qualified immunity); see also Carman
v. City of Eden Prairie, 622 F. Supp. 963, 965-966 (D. Minn. 1985) (holding that private
defendant acting pursuant to state detoxification statute may claim qualified immunity
defense); cf. Del's Big Saver Foods Inc. v. Carpenter Cook, Inc., 795 F.2d 1344, 1351 (7th
Cir. 1986) (recognizing but declining to resolve issue); Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802
F.2d 1131, 1140 n.8 (9th Cir. 1986) (recognizing but declining to resolve issue in case
involving independent contractor defendant).
111 The services rendered by mediators are not comparable to those rendered by
tribunals recognized under Article I or Article III of the Constitution. Historically, federal
mediators have only been utilized with the consent of all parties.
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Application of the reasoning articulated in these cases would extendimmunity to mediators under the Program. The pretrial activities of a
mediator in assisting the litigants to evaluate the merits of their respective
claims and reach a settlement merit protection because they are part of the
judicial process. The contrary argument is that mediators are not actually
deciding cases but merely making recommendations that the parties are free
to reject. Under the Program, rectification of errors is available through
judicial review of the settlement terms arrived at through mediation under
Bankruptcy Rule 9019(a). 112 Given the nature of the services they perform,
the availability of immunity to shield mediators should not be affected by
whether a particular mediator is compensated, as authorized under the
Program. 113 In other contexts, if a mediation is successful, the dispute is
never before a court. Other than through the vigilance of the parties and
their counsel, if represented at all, there are no means to protect the
constitutional rights of the disputants. What remains unclear is whether such
immunity should be absolute or qualified. 14
3. Recent Decisions Involving Immunity for Rendering
ADR Services
Several recent decisions support the proposition that mediators and
others rendering ADR services are entitled to quasi-judicial absolute
immunity when acting within the scope of their official duties. Yet none of
these cases applied the three-prong Butz test. t t 5 In no case to date has
entitlement to immunity been based on whether a particular mediator has
been compensated for the services rendered.
a. Wagshal v. Foster
The recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in Wagshal v. Foster1 6 supports the likelihood that compensated
112 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(a).
113 This is particularly true for mediators assisting bankruptcy courts, such as those
under the Program, because their fee applications are reviewed by the court that authorized
their retention. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
114 See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text discussion of the Wagshal decision;
infra notes 116-127 and accompanying text.
115 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
116 28 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Commentators discussing the Wagshal decision
include Caroline Turner English, Note, Stretching the Doctrine of Absolute Quasi-Judicial
Immunity: Wagshal v. Foster, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 759 (1995); Dorini, supra note 6;
Kevin C. Gray, Case Comment, Torts - Wagshal v. Foster: Mediators, Case Evaluators, and
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mediators under the Program will be protected by quasi-judicial immunity
for conduct within the scope of their official duties. It affirmed the case
below, in which the District Court for the District of Columbia in Wagshal
v. Foster 17 broadly cloaked all court-appointed mediators, case evaluators,
arbitrators and others directly involved in ADR programs with full judicial
immunity when acting in their official capacities.118
In the state court action, the plaintiff, Wagshal, was required to submit
his dispute to a nonbinding, mandatory ADR procedure before a mediator
who received no compensation for his services. Wagshal objected to the
appointment of the first evaluator and questioned the second evaluator's
neutrality. In a letter to the judge, the second evaluator recused himself,
advised the judge that the alleged conflicts were "attenuated" and implied
that the plaintiff's attitude was the principal impediment to the evaluation
process. After appointing a third evaluator, the case was eventually settled.
Thereafter, the plaintiff sued the second mediator in federal court, seeking
damages based on various constitutional deficiencies and tort theories. 1 9
In upholding neutral party immunity, the district court in Wagshal
relied on precedent granting immunity to other agents assisting the judicial
process and acting in their official capacities. This included court-appointed
psychiatrists, prosecutors, probation officers and conciliators in custody
disputes. 120 The district court reasoned that because judges have absolute
immunity, such "immunity may be extended to other officials when their
activities are integrally related to the judicial process and when they
perform ajudicial function as an officer of the court."1 21
Other Neutrals-Should They Be Absolutely Immune?, 26 U. MEM. L. REv. 1229 (1996);
Mediators' Immunity, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITlO. 139 (1994); Court-Appointed
Case Evaluator Entitled to Judicial Immunity, 9 FED. LITIGATOR 273 (1994); Court-Appointed
Neutral Ruled Immune from Suit by D.C. Court, 1995 J. Disp. RESOL. 86.
117 No. 92-2072 (TPJ), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4073 (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 1993).
118 See id. at *6-8.
119 See id. at *2-5.
120 See id. at *7 n.4. Among the cases cited by the district court were Schinner v.
Strathmann, 711 F. Supp. 1143 (D.D.C. 1989) (granting immunity to psychiatrist who
interviewed a criminal defendant to assist a trial judge); Simons v. Bellinger, 643 F.2d 774,
779-782 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (granting immunity to court-appointed committee monitoring the
unauthorized practice of law); Howard v. Drapkin, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893, 903 (1990) (granting
immunity to extending absolute immunity to neutral third persons who are engaged in
mediation, conciliation, evaluation or similar dispute resolution efforts); Austern v. Chicago
Ad. Options Exch., Inc., 898 F.2d 882, 886-887 (2d Cir. 1990) (granting immunity to
arbitrators).
121 Wagshal v. Foster, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4073, at *7 n.4 (D.D.C. 1994).
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The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed Wagshal
and held that a court-appointed volunteer mediator performing tasks within
the scope of her official duties had absolute quasi-judicial immunity.' 22
"The official claiming the immunity 'bears the burden of showing that suchimmunity is justified for the function in question.'" 123 To meet that burden,
the Court of Appeals in Wagshal applied the three factors articulated in the
Supreme Court's decisions in Butz v. Economou 24 and Antoine v. Byers &
Anderson, Inc. :125
(1) whether the functions of the official in question are comparable to
those of a judge; (2) whether the nature of the controversy is intense
enough that future harassment or intimidation by litigants is a realistic
prospect; and (3) whether the system contains safeguards which are
adequate to justify dispensing with private damage suits to control
unconstitutional conduct. 126
Applying these criteria to the Program, the first factor appears to be
directly satisfied because the Order provides for court-appointed mediators
to function in a judicial capacity. The mediators in the Program have an
obligation to report bad faith by the participants to the court, which is more
responsibility than in other ADR programs where they only report whether
a settlement has been reached. However, mediators under the Program lack
the arbitral and rulemaking powers of the judiciary. Nevertheless, the
district court in Wagshal found that the District of Columbia mediators
performed a judicial function, 127 and given that they were mediators rather
than arbitrators, it is safe to assume that they had no greater judicial
function than mediators in the Program. The second factor, whether the
nature of the controversy at issue could generate a challenge to the mediator
122 See Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The term "absolute"
may be somewhat misleading because the quasi-judicial immunity is limited to actions taken
within the scope of employment.
123 Id. at 1252 (citing Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 433 n.4
(1993), quoting with approval from Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991)).
124 438 U.S. 478, 513-517 (1978).
125 508 U.S. 429, 434-437 (1993) (rejecting absolute immunity for court reporters).
126 Wagshal, 28 F.3d at 1252 (citing Simons v. Bellinger, 643 F.2d 774, 778 (1980)).
Consistent with Wagshal, courts have extended immunity, either qualified or absolute, to a
wide range of individuals participating in the judicial process. See Austern v. Chicago Bd.
Options Exch., Inc., 898 F.2d 882, 886 (2d Cir. 1990) (granting immunity to persons
performing binding arbitration); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (extending absolute
immunity for judicial acts to those performing adjudicatory functions within a federal agency).
127 Wagshal v. Foster, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4073, at *7-8 (D.D.C. 1994).
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by a litigant, is highly fact- and litigant-dependent, but presumably, no
different than in other areas. The third factor also appears to be met because
the Order provides safeguards for the following: disqualification of a
mediator (section 2.3), withdrawal from mediation (section 3.6),
confidentiality (sections 5.0 to 5.2), consensual modification of mediation
procedures (section 6.0) and compliance with all other relevant statutes
(section 7.0).
It is noteworthy that the cases cited in Wagshal did not limit the
extension of quasi-judicial immunity to official court employees. 128
Accordingly, if there is compliance with the three criteria enumerated in
Wagshal, in conjunction with Antoine, it appears likely that mediators in the
Program would be protected by quasi-judicial immunity for actions taken
within the scope of their official duties, irrespective of whether they receive
compensation.
b. Austern v. Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc.
The Second Circuit, in Austern v. Chicago Board Options Exchange,
Inc.,129 held that arbitrators and the private organization which sponsored
the arbitration were entitled to absolute immunity "for all acts within the
scope of the arbitral process." 130 The plaintiffs had alleged that the notice of
the arbitration was defective and that the panel had been selected in
violation of the sponsor's own rules. 131 Despite the deficiencies, the court
held that "the acts complained of here.., were sufficiently associated with
the adjudicative phase of the arbitration to justify immunity." 132
In reaching its result, the Second Circuit emphasized that the nature of
the functions performed by arbitrators was sufficiently analogous to that of
judges to merit the same protections. 133 Presumably, such reasoning would
extend to mediators under the Program.
128 Note that neither Antoine nor Wagshal discusses Lugar. Presumably, then, Lugar
can be disregarded outside the § 1983 context, which is another reason that actions are likely
to be brought under § 1983 rather than under common tort theories.
129 898 F. 2d 882 (2d Cir. 1990).
130 Id. at 886.
131 See id. at 884.
13 2 Id.
133 In contrast, in In re Gorski, 766 F.2d 723, 727 (2d Cir. 1985), the Second Circuit
held that a trustee in bankruptcy was personally liable for a breach of his fiduciary duties
arising out of either negligent or intentional conduct or omissions.
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c. Mills v. Killebrew
In Mills v. Killebrew,134 the plaintiffs, who had won in a mandatory
state court mediation procedure, brought federal civil rights claims against
the three lawyers who had served on the mediation panel. Alleging that their
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process rights had been
violated by the mediation process, the plaintiffs sought damages for their
alleged injuries. 135 They asserted that the use of mediation panels in
Michigan was unconstitutional under the Michigan statute and that this
unconstitutionality deprived the mediators of jurisdiction and, consequently,
their immunity under Stump v. Sparkman.136
The district court in Mills dismissed the civil rights claims and held that
the mediators served a quasi-judicial function and were entitled to absolute
immunity. 137 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that so
long as there were no clear Michigan statutory or constitutional
proscriptions against mediation, the mediators had jurisdiction over the
matter. 138 To substantiate that a mediator had acted in the clear absence of
all jurisdiction, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the plaintiffs were required
to prove that the mediator either knew he lacked jurisdiction or acted
despite a clearly valid statute or case law expressly depriving him of such
jurisdiction. 139 The plaintiffs could not meet this burden of proof because
the Michigan mediation rules had been adopted as a local rule, pursuant to a
provision of the Michigan Constitution authorizing the Michigan Supreme
Court to establish procedures for the courts of Michigan.' 40 Accordingly,
the complaint was dismissed.
134 765 F.2d 69, 70-71 (6th Cir. 1985).
135 See id. at 71.
136 See id. In Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), an action essentially under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the Supreme Court held that a judge loses his absolute immunity if "he has
acted in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction.'" Id. at 356-357 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1872)). Stump involved a state judge who had authorized the
sterilization of a fifteen year-old girl on the strength of her mother's assertion that her
daughter was "somewhat retarded." Id. at 351. When the girl subsequently married, she tried
to have children and then learned about the sterilization order. See id. at 353. She sued the
judge, alleging he had acted without authority and with malice, but the Supreme Court held
his conduct was protected by absolute judicial immunity. See id. at 364.
137 See Mills, 765 F.2d at 70.
138 See id. at 70. In reaching its holding, the only precedent squarely relied on by the
Sixth Circuit was Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 1980).
139 See Mills, 765 F.2d at 71.
140 See id. at 72.
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What these recent cases demonstrate is that courts are applying two of
the three tests articulated in Butz. 141 By focusing on the adjudicative
functions performed by mediators, recent case law shielded them under the
doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. In each, the mediator arguably faced
attempts at harassment and intimidation by disappointed disputants. But
because none of these cases raised federal constitutional challenges to the
mediator's conduct, the third facet of the Butz case has not been resolved in
the mediation context.
B. Statutory and Administrative Authorization for Mediator
Immunity
1. Background
The enactment of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA)1 42
spurred the implement'ation of ADR options by requiring every federal
district to promulgate plans to reduce costs and delays in the judicial
system. 143 In the District of Columbia Circuit and the Southern District of
New York, compliance with CJRA included the implementation of
mediation programs. 144
2. Advisory Pronouncements
Official pronouncements of the District of Columbia Circuit and the
Southern District of New York have provided guidance and comfort to
mediators in their jurisdictions. Although less authoritative than formal
opinions or rulings, they are instructive.
141 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
142 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994).
143 Previously, in 1974, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had promulgated a
settlement program known as the Civil Appeals Management Plan (CAMP). See Civil Appeals
Management Plan, 2d Cir. R. App. Pt. C., at 487-491 (West 1980), (amended effective
January 1, 1993), reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1996); see also Irving R. Kaufman,
Must Every Appeal Run the Gamut?-The Civil Appeals Management Plan, 95 YALE L.J. 755,
756 (1986).
CAMP "has the force and effect of a local rule .... " Lake Utopia Paper Ltd. v.
Connelly Containers, Inc., 608 F.2d 928, 929 (2d Cir. 1979). A recently implemented
mediation program of the District Court of the Southern District of New York reported a
settlement rate exceeding seventy-five percent. See Margaret L. Shaw, Courts Point Justice in
a New Direction, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 11, 1994, at Cl, C16.
144 The Program instituted by the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York is discussed in detail supra at notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
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To understand the conclusions reached by the District of Columbia
Circuit and the Southern District of New York, one must first consider
whether the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)145 provides a statutory basis
to protect court-appointed mediators in the federal courts. FTCA shields
government employees from claims when acting within the scope of their
employment.
a. FTCA Immunity
Under the FTCA, exclusive jurisdiction is granted to the federal district
courts for actions against the United States 146 arising out of negligent or
wrongful acts or omissions by federal employees acting within the scope of
their employment. 147 FTCA provides a general waiver of immunity from
suits for torts and protects federal employees from liability for injury or loss
of property and personal injury or death. Upon certification by the Attorney
General that an employee was acting within the scope of employment, the
United States "shall be substituted as the party defendant" and become
exclusively liable for any money judgment. 14 8
In 1988, by amendment to the FTCA, 14 9 the term "Federal agency"
was expanded to include explicitly judicial and legislative branch
employees. 150 The FTCA definition of "'[e]mployee of the government'
includes ... persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official
capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the United States,
whether with or without compensation." 151 Courts have construed the term
"employee of the government" to include persons not officially on the
federal payroll. However, to trigger the usual rules of respondeat superior,
what is critical is that the employee be under the direct, daily control and
supervision of the United States. 152 Because court-appointed mediators are
trained and supervised by the courts, it has been suggested that the FTCA
would provide immunity to such mediators.
145 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 (1994).
146 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994).
147 The Attorney General is required to defend such a suit against a federal employee.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(c) (1994).
148 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (1994). The Attorney General has delegated to the United
States attorneys the authority to make such certifications in civil actions and proceedings
brought against federal employees in their respective districts. See 28 C.F.R. § 15.3 (1996).
149 Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-
694, § 3, 102 Stat. 4563-4564 (1988) [hereinafter Westfall Act]. See also William T. Cornell,
Note, An Evaluation of the Federal Employees' Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act:
Congress' Response to Westfall v. Erwin, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 137 (1989).
150 Prior to the 1988 Amendment, courts had held that "employee of the government"
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b. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
In response to the enactment of the CJRA, the United States Court of
Appeals and the District Court for the District of Columbia established a
mediation program. Under the District of Columbia's program, volunteer
mediators are assigned by the Circuit Executive but are not appointed as
officers or employees of the courts. 153
did not include members of the judicial or legislative branches of the government for FTCA
purposes. See, e.g., United States v. LePatourel, 571 F.2d 405, 408 (8th Cir. 1978), on
remand, 463 F.Supp. 264, 274 (D. Neb. 1978), and on reh. "g, 593 F.2d 827, 830 (8th Cir.
1979) (discussing immunity of federal judge for official but nonjudicial act); Foster v.
MacBride, 521 F.2d 1304, 1305 (9th Cir. 1975); Tomalewski v. United States, 493 F. Supp.
673, 675 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Albright v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 463 F. Supp 1220, 1230
(W.D. Pa. 1979); Vorhauer v. United States, 426 F. Supp. 839, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1976); cf
Cromelin v. United States, 177 F.2d 275, 277-278 (5th Cir. 1949).
151 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1994).
152 See Martarano v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 805, 807-808 (D. Nev. 1964); see
also Witt v. United States, 462 F.2d 1261, 1263-1264 (2d Cir. 1972) (finding private civilian
without employment contract to be acting on behalf of a federal agency).
153 See Letter from William R. Burchill, Jr., General Counsel, Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, to Linda Finkelstein, Circuit Executive, United States Court of
Appeals 1 (Nov. 15, 1990) (reprinted infra at Appendix B) [hereinafter Letter to Finkelstein].
This letter also states that the services rendered by these mediators are not accepted by the
Director of the Administrative Office in accordance with the Guide to Judiciary Policies and
Procedures [hereinafter Guide], Vol. 1, Chap. X, Subchap. 1308.2, Sec. E. That subsection
of the Guide, "Procedures for Accepting Gratuitous and Uncompensated Services," sets forth
the procedures governing volunteer services to the courts of the United States. The Guide
notes that such volunteers are generally students "who wish to volunteer their services in
return for the educational experience of working within the court." Id. at 95. According to the
Guide, "The Judicial Branch approach is to render the volunteer an employee, albeit an
uncompensated one." Id. Prior to commencing any work for the court, such employees must
sign an "Acknowledgement of Gratuitous Services and Waiver for Uncompensated
Employees." Significantly, the employee does not waive rights arising from personal injuries
suffered while in government employ. The Guide indicates that such employees are covered
either under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8.01(l)(B), or the
Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA). The Guide characterizes the former act as "provid[ing]
relief for individuals serving the government without pay or for nominal pay" and the latter as
"predicated on the theory of negligence by the Government or its employees." Id. at 95-96.
For further discussion of the FrCA, see infra notes 177-180 and accompanying text.
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In 1990, the General Counsel (General Counsel) of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts (Administrative Office) responded to a
request by Linda Finkelstein, the Circuit Executive of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, for advice regarding legal
representation and immunity for mediators and early neutral evaluators. 154
In discussing mediator immunity, the General Counsel considered whether
the FTCA and indemnification by the judiciary could protect volunteer
mediators assigned under the District of Columbia's program. The General
Counsel asserted that volunteer mediators come within the ambit of
28 U.S.C. section 2679 of the FTCA, 155 and recommended two options for
providing legal protection to unpaid mediators: legal representation and
immunity. 156
A few months later, the United States Department of Justice, Civil
Division (DOJ) sent a letter to the Honorable Abner J. Mikva, Chief Judge,
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
concerning possible DOJ representation for private attorneys who serve as
mediators for the court. 157 In that letter, the DOJ took the position that a
court-appointed mediator would not satisfy the supervision requirement for
qualifying as an "employee of the Government" under the FTCA. Neither
the General Counsel nor the DOJ discussed mediator immunity under the
common law or 42 U.S.C. section 1983.
154 See Letter to Finkelstein, supra note 153, at 1.
155 See id. at 3; see also Westfall Act at 4563-4564 (overriding Westfall v. Erwin, 484
U.S. 292 (1988)). Congress, in this amendment, knowingly overrode a federal court
interpretation of a federal statute. Wesifall had imposed personal liability for common law
torts on government employees acting within the scope of their employment if they did not
also exercise governmental discretion when performing their duties. See Westfall, 484 U.S.
292, 300 (1988). In overriding Wes~fall, Congress granted absolute immunity to all employees
of the government acting within the scope of their employment, eliminating the requirement
that the employee must also exercise discretion. This was done by amending the FTCA and
was premised on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See H.R. REP. No. 700 at 5 (1988),
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, 5948.
156 See Letter to Finkelstein, supra note 153, at 2-4.
157 See Letter from Stephen C. Bransdorfer, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, United
States Department of Justice, Civil Division, to Hon. Abner J. Mikva, Chief Judge, United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (Mar. 13, 1991) (reprinted infra
at Appendix C) [hereinafter Letter to MikvaJ. The Letter to Mikva referred to the Letter to
Finkelstein and was signed by Stephen C. Bransdorfer, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Division. See id. at 1, 2.
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e. District Court for the Southern District of New York
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
(SDNY) has instituted a mediation program staffed by volunteer mediators.
Relying on recent court decisions, the Letter to Finkelstein of November
15, 1990 and the Letter to Mikva of March 13, 1991, an advisory group to
the SDNY (Advisory Group) appointed under the CJRA has taken the
position that a person serving as a volunteer mediator and acting under an
order of a United States District Court Judge of the SDNY would be
entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. 158 Mediators assist "the courts
in the performance of an official function" and "play an integral part in the
implementation of the judicial function."159
An analysis of the decisions on which the Advisory Group's position is
based reveals an extension of the doctrine of judicial immunity developed
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.160 Those cases justify immunity as a
function of "the characteristics of the judicial process .... "-161 It is
significant that the Advisory Group accepted the recommendation of the
DOJ and did not rely on the protections afforded by the FTCA, even though
FTCA protections now ostensibly extend to the judicial branch.
158 See Memorandum from Hon. Robert W. Sweet to Volunteer Court Mediators 1 (July
17, 1992) (reprinted infra at Appendix D) [hereinafter Sweet Memorandum]. The Advisory
Group confirmed that the positions stated in the Finkelstein and Mikva letters remained in
effect when the Memorandum was issued and thus would provide a basis for mediator
protection from defending suits arising out of their conduct. See id.
15 9 Id. at 1, 2.
160 See supra notes 75-110 and accompanying text.
161 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978) (granting absolute immunity to
administrative law judges within a federal administrative agency, even though they are
members of the Executive Branch, because they are functionally comparable to judges). The
other cases listed in the Sweet Memorandum are the following: Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 427 (1976) (extending absolute common law immunity of state prosecutors to actions
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 574-575 (1959) (granting immunity
against defamation for acting director of an agency acting within the outer limits of his duties,
even if acting in malice); Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 950 F.2d 1471, 1474-1475 (9th
Cir. 1991), overruled by 508 U.S. 429, 434-438 (1993) (holding that court reporters are not
entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity); Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388-1391 (9th Cir. 1987) (granting judicial or quasi-judicial
immunity to bankruptcy judges, clerks and Chapter 7 trustee); Sharma v. Stevas, 790 F.2d
1486, 1486 (9th Cir. 1986) (granting absolute quasi-judicial immunity for clerk of the United
States Supreme Court under FrCA because his acts were an integral part of the judicial
process); Internationall Union, United Auto, Aerospace, and Agriculture Implement Workers
of American and Local 656 and 985 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 701 F.2d 1181, 1185 (6th Cir.
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d. Legal Representation Under 28 U.S.C. Sections 516 to
519
Both the General Counsel and the DOJ agree that legal representation,
in the form of services or payments, is available to a mediator sued for acts
arising out of his or her appointment as a mediator. What is critical is that
the mediator's services be in the "interest of the United States." 162
"[The conduct of litigation in which the United States, an 9gency, or
officer thereof is a party, or is interested. . . is reserved to officers of the
Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General." 1 63 The
General Counsel has asserted that the DOJ "would be receptive to the
argument that mediators ... serve to further a Federal interest."164 Such
service constitutes a United States interest "within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. section 516 to 519" and "would be consistent with the provision of
representation to special masters and jurors .... ",165 However, unlike the
court's mediators under the Order, special masters and jurors are either not
compensated or minimally compensated for their services. Although
mediators serving under the Order are not compensated by the federal
government, the court still exercises control over their compensation. 166
1983) (granting immunity to arbitrators); Marcedes v. Barret, 453 F.2d 391, 392 (3d Cir.
1971) (granting immunity to judges and court employees); Henig v. Odorioso, 385 F.2d 491,
493-494 (3d Cir. 1967) (granting immunity to judges and court employees); Bauers v. Heisel,
361 F.2d 581, 591 (3d Cir. 1966) (en banc) (granting immunity for county prosecutor
prosecuting a minor, even though state jurisdictional statute specifically excluded minors from
prosecutor's responsibility); Raitport v. Provident NationalU Bank, 451 F. Supp. 522, 527-529
(E.D. Pa. 1978) (granting immunity to various state court staff).
16228 U.S.C. § 517 (1994).
163 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1994). This section of the United States Code sets forth the
powers and scope of authority of the DOJ, with Chapter 31. which includes 28 U.S.C.
§§ 516-519 (1994), specifically discussing the role of the Attorney General. Representation by
the United States Attorney's Office requires DOJ approval. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.15 (1996).
164 See Letter to Finkelstein, supra note 153, at 2.
165 Id.
166 This is done through Bankruptcy Court review of fee applications submitted by
professionals. See 11 U.S.C. § 330 (1994).
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The DOJ's position is that it reserves the right "to review the nature of
the suit and the mediator's involvement in order to assure that
representation is indeed in the interest of the United States."167 Such
representation, according to the DOJ, would be premised on 28 U.S.C.
sections 516 to 518, which delegate to the Attorney General responsibility
for attending to the interests of the United States in court proceedings. This
includes the interests of the judicial branch of the federal government. 168
Mediators assist "the Court in performing its official functions" because
they are assigned cases after being selected, trained and supervised by the
court. 169 Under those circumstances, "representation of such persons would
be in the interests of the United States if they are sued concerning their
work for the Court." 17
0
Although federal employment is not a prerequisite for the DOJ to
provide legal representation, such representation is rarely provided to
nonemployees. 17 1 Furthermore, the DOJ is generally unwilling to commit in
advance to the defense of private persons rendering services to the courts. 172
However, as noted above, the DOJ has approved legal representation for
nonemployees in cases involving special masters and jurors, who arguably
render services similar to those of mediators. 173
The compensation factor also raises the issue of whether mediators in
the Program qualify as federal employees. That status is pivotal in situations
where the DOJ cannot provide direct legal representation. In such
circumstances, the judiciary has access to funds to pay litigation costs "'in
167 Letter to Mikva, supra note 157, at 2. DOJ representation is generally not available
if the matter involves a federal criminal investigation or prosecution. See id. Note that the
DOi relies on authorization set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 516-518, whereas the General Counsel
asserts that 28 U.S.C. § 519 would also be available. 28 U.S.C. § 519 requires the Attorney
General to "supervise all litigation to which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is
a party .... " 28 U.S.C. § 519 (1994).
168 See United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 707-708 (1988).
Providence Journal construed 28 U.S.C. § 518(a) as prohibiting a special prosecutor,
appointed by a district court judge to prosecute the violation of a restraining order, from
representing the interests of the United States before the Supreme Court without the
authorization of the Solicitor General. See id. Cases construing 28 U.S.C. §§ 516-519 are
distinct from the two.lines of cases granting absolute immunity to judges for their judicial acts
and other participants in the judicial process, even for conduct beyond the scope of their
jurisdiction.
169 Letter to Mikva, supra note 157, at 1.
170 id. at 1-2.
171 See Letter to Finkelstein, supra note 153, at 2.
172 See id.; see also Letter to Mikva, supra note 157, at 2.
173 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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those cases where it is determined that it is in the best interest of the United
States and necessary to carry out the purposes of the Federal Judiciary's
appropriations for the judicial officer or body to be defended or
represented.'"174 Where a DOJ attorney is not reasonably available, 28
U.S.C. section 463 authorizes the Administrative Office to pay the costs of
defending United States judges and court employees sued in their official
capacities. 175 However, the authorizing language of section 463 limits its
availability to court employees only. Nonetheless, the General Counsel
stated "that my office would be sensitive to the equities in favor of
defending mediators and evaluators, who are assisting the courts in the
performance of an official function without compensation."176
e. FTCA Immunity
In discussing mediator immunity, the General Counsel suggested two
potential theories for protection: the Federal Tort Claims Act177 and
indemnification by the judiciary. The General Counsel believes that
volunteer mediators come within the ambit of 28 U.S.C. section 2679 of the
FTCA. 178 The DOJ, however, disagrees on the ground that an individual is
not considered an "employee" under the FTCA unless the government
supervises and controls the day-to-day physical performance of that
individual's work. Thus, while the Attorney General will consider
representation of a court-appointed mediator under 28 U.S.C. sections 516
to 518 in an appropriate case, "we cannot provide assurance that the
Attorney General would seek to invoke the Westfall Act in any suit against
a mediator." 179
Accordingly, it would appear that the FTCA does not apply to
independent contractors because they are not subject to the detailed physical
control of the United States in the performance of their duties. Independent
contractors for the United States are specifically excluded from the
definition of a "federal employee."18 0 Thus, if mediators were classified as
174 Letter to Finkelstein, supra note 153, at 2 (quoting Letter to Rowland F. Kirks, 53
Comp. Gen. 301 (1973)).
175 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 516-519 (1994).
176 Letter to Finkelstein, supra note 153, at 3 (emphasis added).
177 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 (1994).
178 See Letter to Finkelstein, supra note 153, at 3. See also Westfall Act, at 4563; supra
note 155 and accompanying text.
179 Letter to Mikva, supra note 157, at 2.
180 See Strangi v. United States, 211 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1954); Fries v. United States,
170 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1948); White v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 259 (W.D. Pa. 1979);
Hopson v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 804 (D. Ark. 1956).
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independent contractors, they would not be protected under the FTCA.
Whether a mediator could satisfy the FTCA test of being under the day-
to-day physical direction of the government remains an open issue. Given
the conflict between the positions of the Attorney General and the General
Counsel, the better course would appear to be to seek representation for
court-appointed mediators under 28 U.S.C. sections 516 to 518 and assert
either common law immunity or immunity premised on 42 U.S.C.
section 1983, as appropriate, rather than rely on the FTCA. Further
amendments may be needed to the FTCA to clarify that mediators assist the
judicial process and are sufficiently supervised by the court, through its
training program, to qualify for FTCA protection.
f. Indemnification by the Judiciary
The second proposal by the General Counsel and the Attorney General
was judiciary indemnification. The major disadvantage of this form of
protection is that, according to the Attorney General, in the absence of
exceptional circumstances, requests for indemnification will not be
considered before entry of an adverse judgment or award. Procedurally, a
court-appointed mediator held liable for damages based on the performance
of official services could submit a request for indemnification to the Judicial
Conference for consideration.181 The DOJ, however, asserts "that there is
considerable question that a mediator could be indemnified." 182
3. State Statutory Protections
State immunity statutes grant either full or qualified immunity to all
mediators or to mediators participating in designated matters referred by the
courts. Florida, uniquely, grants all court-appointed mediators full judicial
immunity in the same manner and to the same extent as a judge.'8 3 Most
state statutes qualify the immunity granted to mediators to certain practice
areas and to actions taken within the scope of their employment. 184 The
specific work areas include farm-lender and agricultural mediation services
in Minnesota, Mississippi, North Dakota, Wisconsin and Wyoming and
medical malpractice and medical-related mediation services in Montana,
181 See Letter to Finkelstein, supra note 153, at 3 (indicating that an indemnification
policy, adopted by the Judicial Conference and set forth in the Guide, Volume I, Chapter X1,
Part E, Section V, extends only to officers and employees of the judiciary).
182 Letter to Mikva, supra note 157, at 2.
183 This approach is criticized in Richardson, supra note 17, at 628.
184 These states are: California, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. See infra Appendix E.
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Nebraska, Nevada and Utah. Other states have opted to limit liability to bad
faith, willful or wanton misconduct or similar conduct. 185 A few states have
applied both qualifications, granting mediators immunity within the scope
of their employment but imposing liability for willful or wanton or similar
conduct. 186
Although the issue is not entirely free from doubt, state immunity
statutes presumably would not protect mediators in the Program. What is
instructive, however, is the fact that at least twenty-two states 187 have
enacted statutes addressing the issue of mediator immunity and do not rely
on doctrines ofjudicial immunity which have evolved in the courts.
State legislative solutions to the mediator immunity issue are, by and
large, limited to very fact-specific situations. In part, this can be explained
by the comparative newness of mediation as an ADR technique. Most of the
challenges to mediator conduct have been made in the federal courts. As
resort to mediation under state legislation increases, the Author believes that
reliance on federal precedents will increase, and cause many state
legislatures to reexamine the scope of their mediation statutes.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Generally, mediation provides a comparatively economical and practical
alternative to judicial proceedings. Based on a functional analysis, the
primary role of mediators is similar to what judges do when they preside at
settlement conferences. Judicial, administrative and statutory protections
available under both federal and state law all favor some level of immunity
for mediators.
From a mediator's perspective, the availability of absolute quasi-
judicial immunity would make his participation in the process most
attractive. Such immunity shields a mediator from the burdens of litigation
in all but the most limited situations. 188 This solution works when
mediation is sponsored by a court which presumably could review
allegations that the constitutional rights of the participants had been
impaired, as required by the Supreme Court in Butz. 189
185 These states include Colorado, Iowa, Nevada, New Jersey, Oklahoma and Virginia.
See infra Appendix E.
186 These states include Connecticut and Virginia. See infra Appendix E.
187 See infra Appendix E.
188 See supra notes 32-61 and accompanying text.
189 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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Application of quasi-judicial immunity is far more troubling when
private mediation is used outside of a court setting. The constitutional
safeguards required under the third test of Butz may not be met due to the
lack ofjudicial review of the settlement reached through mediation. In those
circumstances, the parties are presumably free to ignore the mediated
settlement terms and pursue other remedies. For privately arranged
mediation, the Author believes that qualified immunity provides the best
balance between promoting the mediation process and protecting the
participants in that process. Qualified immunity would protect a mediator
acting within the scope of his authority, unless he violated clearly
established law.190 But because vindication generally requires litigation, the
transaction costs are quite high. Presumably, such mediators protect
themselves by charging rates sufficiently high to allow the purchase of
malpractice insurance. That may, as a practical matter, limit the resort to
private mediation.
Applying these conclusions to the Program, the Author believes that
mediators under the Program should be granted quasi-judicial immunity. In
the performance of her duties, the safeguards imposed by Butz are met
because such mediators exercise discretion and judgment, face the threat of
harassment and intimidation and operate under the directive of the court,
which can ensure that the constitutional rights of the participants are
protected. Mediators under the Order, even if compensated, likely have
immunity against tort claims based on actions or omissions taken incident to
their service to the court. 191 Intentional torts or criminal conduct, if proven,
are not immunized because such conduct is not within the scope of
employment. 192
Compensation paid to a mediator should not affect the availability of
the protection afforded by either quasi-judicial or qualified immunity.
However, all of the significant case law as well as advisory positions taken
by the Administrative Office and the DOJ involved volunteer mediators.
Accordingly, due to the lack of judicial, statutory and administrative
190 See supra notes 62-110 and accompanying text.
191 Note that this Article does not address the Article I and Article III Constitutional or
Due Process issues raised by the appointment of a mediator to settle a case or controversy
actually commenced in a United States District or Bankruptcy Court.
192 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2680(h) (1994). As the Supreme Court stated in
dicta in hmbler v. Pachtmian, "This Court has never suggested that the policy considerations
which compel civil immunity for certain governmental officials also place them beyond the
reach of the criminal law. Even judges, cloaked with absolute civil immunity for centuries,
could be punished criminally for willful deprivations of constitutional rights on the strength of
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994), the criminal analog of § 1983." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
429 (1976) (footnote omitted). See also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974).
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authority on compensated, as distinct from voluntary, pro bono, court-
appointed mediators, it cannot be stated conclusively that mediators under
the Program have such immunity.
One means to resolve the problem for mediators serving in the Program
is for the court to amend the Order and declare that absolute quasi-judicial
immunity extends to court-appointed mediators for acts within the scope of
their official duties. Such a rule would comport with the standards for
absolute quasi-judicial immunity set forth by the Supreme Court in Butz v.
Economoul93 and Antoine v. Byers & Anderson.194 At least one court, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Wagshal v. Foster,195
based its holding that mediators serve a judicial function and are engaged in
judicial conduct on those two decisions. Support can also be found in the
three lines of cases granting absolute, qualified or defamation immunity to
participants in the judicial process or to those rendering services
functionally comparable to those performed by a judge. 196 Those cases
either rely on rules of common law immunity or doctrines derived from the
common law in cases brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.197
Alternatively, at least three options exist for providing court-appointed
mediators with legal protection at both the federal and state levels:
(1) government-paid legal representation to assert various theories of
immunity; (2) government-paid insurance; and (3) indemnification. Under
the Program, the circumstances under which paid legal representation will
be provided to mediators could be articulated in an amendment to the Order,
or perhaps preferably, in a ruling from the Administrative Office. As the
sponsoring organization of the Program, the court could obtain an
appropriate insurance policy paid for from either general bankruptcy filing
fees or solely by motion fees paid by those seeking approval to retain a
mediator. The third option, providing indemnification rights, would, at the
very least, require approval by the Administrative Office, which the Author
believes is highly unlikely. However, the costs of these solutions may limit
the accessibility and feasibility of mediation, particularly in smaller cases-
an undesirable result.
193 438 U.S. 478 (1978). See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
'94 528 U.S. 429 (1993) (holding court reporters not entitled to absolute quasi-judicial
immunity). See supra notes 32-61 and accompanying text.
195 28 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1994). See supra notes 116-128 and accompanying text.
196 See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 498 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Burns v. Reed is discussed supra at notes 40, 43, 53-54 and
accompanying text. Defamation immunity protects the absolute privilege of statements made
in the course of a court proceeding; no cases to date have raised this issue in connection with
mediators performing within the scope of their duties.
197 See supra notes 27-110 and accompanying text.
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Case law to date establishes that there is a high likelihood that
mediators can successfully defend actions using doctrines of judicial
immunity. The Author proposes granting quasi-judicial immunity to
mediators serving in court-annexed mediation programs because the option
of judicial review safeguards the constitutional rights of the participants.
The long-term success of mediation as an ADR technique hinges on judicial
or statutory clarification of the availability of immunity defenses to make
participation in the process more attractive to skilled mediators.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX D [OF THE LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULES OF THE
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF NEW YORK]. IN RE ADOPTION OF PROCEDURES
GOVERNING MEDIATION OF MATTERS IN BANKRUPTCY CASES
AND ADVISORY PROCEEDINGS, GENERAL ORDER N-1 17
IT IS ORDERED that a court mediation program for matters not involving
a governmental unit is established under the following Rules:
1.0 Assignment of Matters to Mediation.
1.1 By Court Order. The court may order assignment of a matter to
mediation upon its own motion, or upon a motion by any party in interest
or the U.S. Trustee. The motion by a party in interest must be filed
promptly after filing the initial document in the matter. Notwithstanding
assignment of a matter or proceeding to mediation, it shall be set for the
next appropriate hearing on the court docket in the normal course of setting
required for such a matter.
1.2 Stipulation of Counsel. Any matter may be referred to mediation upon
stipulated order submitted by counsel of record or by a party appearing pro
Se.
1.3 Types of Matters Subject to Mediation. Unless otherwise ordered by the
presiding judge, any adversary proceeding, contested matter or other
dispute may be referred by the court to mediation.
1.4 Mediation Procedures. Upon assignment of a matter to mediation, this
General Order shall become binding on all parties subject to such
mediation.
2.0 The Mediator.
2.1 Mediation Register. The Clerk of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of N.Y. shall establish and maintain a Register of persons
qualifying under paragraph 2.1.A.
A. Application and Qualification Procedures for Mediation Register.
To qualify for the Mediation Register of this court, a person must apply
and meet the following minimum qualifications:
(1) For General Services as a Mediator. A person must have been a
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member of the Bar in any state or the District of Columbia for at
least five years; currently be a member of the Bar in good standing
of any state or the District of Columbia; be admitted to practice in
the Southern District of N.Y.; and be certified by the Chief Judge
to be competent to perform the duties of a mediator. Each person
certified as a mediator should take the oath or affirmation
prescribed by 28 U.S.C. section 453 before serving as a mediator.
(2) For Services as a Mediator Where the Court Has Determined
the Need for Special Skills.
(a) A person must have been authorized to practice for at least
four years under the laws of the State 6f New York as a
professional, including but not limited to, an accountant, real
estate broker, appraiser, engineer or other professional.
Notwithstanding the requirement for authorization to practice
under the laws of the State of N.Y., an investment banker
professional who has been practicing for a period of at least
four years shall be eligible to serve as a mediator; and
(b) Be an active member in good standing, or if retired, have
been a member in good standing, of any applicable
professional organization; and
(c) Not have:
(1) Been suspended, or have had a professional license
revoked, or have pending any proceeding to suspend or
revoke such license; or
(2) Resigned from applicable professional organization
while an investigation into allegations of misconduct
which would warrant suspension, disbarment or
professional license revocation was pending; or
(3) Have been convicted of a felony.
B. Removal from Mediation Register. A person shall be removed from
the Mediation Register either at the person's request or by court order.
If removed from the Register by court order, the person shall not be
returned to the Register absent a court order obtained upon motion to
the Chief Judge and affidavit suffieiently explaining the circumstances
of such removal and reasons justifying the return of the person to the
Register.
2.2 Appointment of the Mediator.
A. The parties will choose a mediator from the Register. If the parties
cannot agree upon a mediator within seven (7) days of assignment to
mediation, the court shall appoint a mediator and alternate mediator.
B. If the mediator is unable to serve, the mediator shall file, within
seven (7) days after receipt of the notice of appointment, a notice of
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inability to accept an appointment and immediately serve a copy upon
the appointed alternate mediator. The alternate mediator shall become
the mediator for the matter if such person fails to file a notice of
inability to accept appointment within seven (7) days after filing of the
original mediator's notice of inability. If neither can serve, the court
will appoint another mediator and alternate mediator.
2.3 Disqualification of a Mediator. Any person selected as a mediator may
be disqualified for bias or prejudice as provided in 28 U.S.C. section 144 or
if not disinterested, under 11 U.S.C. section 101. Any party selected as a
mediator shall be disqualified in any matter where 28 U.S.C. section 455
would require disqualification if that person were a justice, judge or
magistrate.
3.0 The Mediation.
3.1 Time and Place of Mediation. Upon consultation with all attorneys and
pro se parties subject to the mediation, the mediator shall fix a reasonable
time and place for the initial mediation conference of the parties with the
mediator and promptly shall give the attorneys and pro se parties advance
written notice of the conference. The conference shall be set as soon after
the entry of the mediation order and as long in advance of the court's final
evidentiary hearing as practicable. To ensure prompt dispute resolution, the
mediator shall have the duty and authority to establish the time for all
mediation activities, including private meetings between the mediator and
parties and the submission of relevant documents. The mediator shall have
the authority to establish a deadline for the parties to act upon a proposed
settlement or upon a settlement recommendation from the mediator.
3.2 Mediation Conference. A representative of each party shall attend the
mediation conference, and must have complete authority to negotiate all
disputed amounts and issues. The mediator shall control all procedural
aspects of the mediation. The mediator shall also have the discretion to
require that the party representative or a non-attorney principal of the party
with settlement authority be present at any conference. The mediator shall
also determine when the parties are to be present in the conference room.
The mediator shall report any willful failure to attend or participate in good
faith in the mediation process or conference. Such failure may result in the
imposition of sanctions by the court.
3.3 Recommendations of the Mediator. The mediator shall have no
obligation to make written comments or recommendations; provided,
however, that the mediator may furnish the attorneys for the parties and any
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pro se party with a written settlement recommendation. Any such
recommendation shall not be filed with the court.
3.4 Post-Mediation Procedures. Promptly upon conclusion of the mediation
conference, and in any event no later than 3 P.M. two (2) business days
prior to the date fixed for hearing referred to in paragraph 1.1, the mediator
shall file a final report showing compliance or noncompliance with the
requirements of this General Order by the parties and the mediation results.
If in the mediation the parties reach an agreement regarding the disposition
of the matter, they shall determine who shall prepare and submit to the
court a stipulated order or judgment, or joint motion for approval of
compromise of controversy (as appropriate), within twenty (20) days of the
conference. Failure to timely file such a stipulated order or judgment or
motion when agreement is reached shall be a basis for the court to impose
appropriate sanctions. Absent such a stipulated order or judgment or
motion, no party shall be bound by any statement made or action taken
during the mediation process. If the mediation ends in an impasse, the
matter will be heard or tried as scheduled.
3.5 Termination of Mediation. Upon receipt of the mediator's final report,
the mediation will be deemed terminated, and the mediator excused, and
relieved from further responsibilities in the matter without further court
order.
3.6 Withdrawal From Mediation. Any matter referred pursuant to this
General Order may be withdrawn from mediation by the judge assigned to
the matter at any time upon determination for any reason the matter is not
suitable for mediation. Nothing in this General Order shall prohibit or
prevent any party in interest, the U.S. Trustee or the mediator from filing a
motion to withdraw a matter from mediation for cause.
4.0 Compensation of Mediators. The mediator's compensation shall be on
such terms as are satisfactory to the mediator and the parties, and subject to
court approval if the estate is to be charged with such expense.
5.0 Confidentiality.
5.1 Confidentiality as to the Court and Third Parties. Any statements made
by the mediator, by the parties or by others during the mediation process
shall not be divulged by any of the participants in the mediation (or their
agents) or by the mediator to the court or to any third party. All records,
reports, or other documents received or made by a mediator while serving
in such capacity shall be confidential and shall not be provided to the court,
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unless they would be otherwise admissible. The mediator shall not be
compelled to divulge such records or to testify in regard to the mediation in
connection with any arbitral, judicial or other proceeding, including any
hearing held by the court in connection with the referred matter. Nothing in
this section, however, precludes the mediator from reporting the status
(though not content) of the mediation effort to the court orally or in writing,
or from complying with the obligation set forth in 3.2 to report failures to
attend or to participate in good faith.
5.2 Confidentiality of Mediation Effort. Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence shall apply to mediation proceedings. Except as permitted by Rule
408, no person may rely on or introduce as evidence in connection with any
arbitral, judicial or other proceeding, including any hearing held by this
court in connection with the referred matter, any aspect of the mediation
effort, including, but not limited to:
A. Views expressed or suggestions made by any party with respect to a
possible settlement of the dispute;
B. Admissions made by the other party in the course of the mediation
proceedings;
C. Proposals made or views expressed by the mediator.
6.0 Consensual Modification of Mediation Procedures. Additional rules and
procedures for the mediation may be negotiated and agreed upon by the
mediator and the parties at any time during the mediation process.
7.0 Compliance With the U.S. Code, Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, and Court Rules and Orders. Nothing in this General Order shall
relieve any debtor, party in interest, or the U.S. Trustee from complying
with any other court orders, U.S. Code, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, or this court's Local Rules, including times fixed for discovery
or preparation for any court hearing pending on the matter.
Dated: Nov. 10, 1993, New York, N.Y.
BURTON R. LIFLAND
Chief U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
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APPENDIX B
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS
L. RALPH MECHAM WILLIAM R. BURCHILL JR.
DIRECTOR GENERAL COUNSEL
JAMES L MACKLIN, JR WASHINGTON. D.C 20544
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
November 15, 1990
Ms. Linda Finkelstein
Circuit Executive
United States Court of Appeals
United States Courthouse
3rd & Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
Dear Ms. Finkelstein:
I am writing in further response to your recent request for written
advice about the availability of legal representation for mediators and early
neutral evaluators who perform services for the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. This letter summarizes the legal
protection available to mediators or evaluators who are sued for actions
taken incident to their service for these courts.
According to the information you provided, mediation in the
circuit and district courts, and early neutral evaluation in the district
court;198 are programs established by the courts to facilitate early settlement
or resolution of cases. Cases are designated for mediation or evaluation in
accordance with applicable court procedures; in the district court,
designation must be with the consent of the parties. Mediators and
evaluators are assigned to the designated cases by the Circuit Executive.
Mediators and evaluators serve as volunteers and are not compensated for
their services (except that the circuit court allows reimbursement for minor
out-of-pocket expenses). Mediators and evaluators are not appointed as
officers or employees of the courts, nor are their services accepted by the
Director of the Administrative Office in accordance with the Guide to
198 Although there are some similarities, the early neutral evaluation program in the
district court is not an arbitration program under 28 U.S.C. §§ 651 to 658 (1994).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Ms. Linda Finkelstein
Page 2
Judiciary Policies and Procedures, Volume I, Chapter X, Subchapter
1308.2, section E.
Addressing first the question of legal representation, 28 U.S.C.
sections 516 to 519 authorize the Department of Justice to conduct and
defend litigation in which officers of the United States are parties and
otherwise to attend to the interests of the United States in court proceedings.
Representation by the United States Attorney's office must be approved by
the Department of Justice in accordance with their regulations, set forth at
28 C.F.R. section 50.15. The fact of Federal employment is not a
prerequisite for the Department to provide legal representation to an
individual but representation is only rarely provided in the absence of
Federal employment. The Department has provided representation to
persons who were not employed by the Judicial Branch in at least two
situations: where the persons who were sued had served as special masters
or as jurors.
Generally speaking, the Department of Justice is unwilling to
commit in advance to the defense of private persons rendering services to
the courts. If a lawsuit were filed against a mediator or evaluator for actions
incident to service for the courts, this agency would make a
recommendation to the Department of Justice concerning the provision of
legal representation. We believe the Department would be receptive to the
arguments that mediators and evaluators serve to further a Federal interest
and that a lawsuit against them arising from that service is a case in which
the United States has an interest within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
sectionsection 516 to 519. Providing legal representation in these situations
would be consistent with the provision of representation to special masters
and jurors who also are not employees but who provide valuable services to
the court.
In instances where the Department of Justice is unavailable to
provide representation, the Comptroller General has ruled that the Judiciary
may use appropriated funds to pay the costs of litigation "in those cases
where it is determined that it is in the best interest of the United States and
necessary to carry out the purposes of the Federal Judiciary's appropriations
for the judicial officer or body to be defended or represented." See Letter to
Rowland F. Kirks, 53 Comp. Gen. 302 (1973). In addition, 29 U.S.C.
section 463 authorizes the Administrative Office to pay the costs of
defending judicial officers and employees sued in their official capacities
where a Department of Justice attorney is not reasonably available under 28
U.S.C. sections 516 to 519, as described above. Because the authorizing
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language of section 463 is limited to justices, judges, officers, Ms. Linda
and employees of any court of the United States, this section would not
appear to allow the agency to pay defense costs for mediators or evaluators
who are not court employees. The Administrative Office regulations
governing legal representation of judicial officers and employees are set
forth in the Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures, Volume I, Chapter
XI, Part E, to which the above-cited Comptroller General opinion is
attached.
Should a situation arise where the Department of Justice is
unavailable to represent a mediator or evaluator, this agency would then
determine whether, under the circumstances of the case, appropriations
provided to the agency are available to pay the costs of defense. This
determination would be made based on the facts of the case, the language of
the applicable appropriations act, and relevant Comptroller General
decisions. Although I cannot offer any blanket assurances in this regard, I
can assure you that my office would be sensitive to the equities in favor of
defending mediators and evaluators, who are assisting the courts in the
performance of an official function without compensation.
A second consideration relating to possible lawsuits against
mediators and evaluators is their potential liability should any adverse
judgment for monetary damages be entered against them. It is unclear what
protection would ultimately be available to mediators or evaluators, but two
possibilities exist: the protections afforded by the Federal Tort Claims Act,
and the possibility of indemnification by the Judiciary.
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. sections 2671 et
_ef, Federal employees are protected from liability for injury or loss of
property or personal injury or death resulting from negligent acts or
omissions within the scope of employment. The Attorney General is
required to defend any suit against a Federal employee for such damage or
injury. See 28 U.S.C. section 2679(c). Further, upon certification that an
employee was acting within the scope of employment, the United States
"shall be substituted as the party defendant" and thus becomes exclusively
liable for any resulting judgment for monetary damages. See id. section
2679(d).
For purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the term employee
includes "persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official
capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the United States,
whether with or without compensation." I have been unable to find any case
law confirming that this definition would apply to individuals serving the
courts in the capacity of mediators or evaluators. At least one court has
concluded that prospective Federal jurors are not employees within the
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meaning of the Federal Tort Claims Act. See Sellers v. United States, 672
F. Supp. 446 (D. Id. 1987). However, the discussion in Sellers of factors
leading to that conclusion would appear to support an argument that Federal
mediators or evaluators - who are selected to serve and generally supervised
by the court in the performance of their duties - fall within the act's
definition of employee and therefore enjoy the protections of the act.
The Judicial Conference has also adopted an indemnification
policy, set forth in the Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures, Volume
I, Chapter XI, Part E, section V. In the absence of exceptional
circumstances, requests for indemnification will not be considered before
entry of an adverse judgment or award. The policy states that it extends
only to officers and employees of the Judiciary, and it thus would not
appear to be applicable to mediators or evaluators who are not court
employees. However, a mediator or evaluator who is held liable for
damages based on the performance of official services for the court could
submit a request for indemnification to the Judicial Conference for
consideration or could request that the policy be amended to allow
consideration of such requests.
I hope the foregoing discussion is helpful to you. Should you have
any further questions, you may wish to contact Marilyn J. Holmes,
Assistant General Counsel.
Sincerely,
/s/
William R. Burchill, Jr.
General Counsel
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APPENDIX C
U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Division
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Washington, D.C. 20530
March 13, 1991
Honorable Abner J. Mikva
Chief Judge
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit
333 Constitution Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001-2866
Re: Possible Representation for D.C. Circuit
Mediators by the Department of Justice
Dear Chief Judge Mikva:
Several weeks ago, Nancy Stanley from the Circuit Executive's
Office contacted Douglas Letter of the Civil Division concerning the
question of possible Department of Justice representation for private
attorneys who serve as mediators for the Court. It is our understanding that
Ms. Stanley contacted Mr. Letter at your behest and that of former Chief
Judge Wald. In addition, Ms. Stanley provided us with a copy of a letter
dated November 15, 1990 from the General Counsel of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, William Burchill, Jr., t6-Linda
Finkelstein regarding this issue.
In response to Ms. Stanley's recent inquiry, it appears that the
Department of Justice would be able to provide representation to the Court's
mediators if they are sued concerning their conduct or service as mediators.
Such representation would be based on the fact that, pursuant to 26 U.S.C.
516 through 518, the Attorney General is responsible for attending to the
interests of the United States in court. The Supreme Court made clear in
United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693 (1988), that this
responsibility includes the interests of the Judicial Branch of the Federal
Government.
We understand that the D.C. Circuit mediators carry out their
functions pursuant to a program established by Court order and that their
primary purpose is to make the Circuit more efficient by facilitating
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settlement of cases within the Court's jurisdiction. We also understand that
the mediators are selected by the Court, trained by its personnel, and
generally supervised by it, as well as that the Court assigns the cases that
will be handled by the mediators. Under these circumstances, it appears to
us that the mediators are assisting the Court in performing its official
functions, and that representation of such persons would be in the interests
of the United States if they are sued concerning their work for the Court.
While it appears that representation generally would be available, it
cannot actually be authorized until such time as a suit arises and we are able
to review the nature of the suit and the mediator's involvement in order to
assure that representation is indeed in the interest of the United States.
Additionally, as is true for judges'and other federal officers, representation
by the Department of Justice is generally not available if the matter involves
a federal criminal investigation or prosecution.
Although it appears that representation would be provided for
mediators, I wish to reiterate the statements in Mr. Burchill's November 15
letter concerning indemnification should a judgment actually be entered.
(Since we think that there may be a strong argument that the Court's
mediators would be covered by the protection of absolute immunity, we
would hope that this situation will not occur.) Mr. Burchill pointed out that
possible indemnification from government funds is not considered in
advance of a judgment or award, and that there is considerable question that
a mediator could be indemnified.
Mr. Burchill's letter also mentions that the Court's mediators
might be covered by the "Westfall Act" (see 28 U.S.C. 2679), under which
the United States is substituted as the party defendant for claims of
negligent acts or omissions of "any employee of the Government" acting
within the scope of his office or employment. At this point, we are not
willing to take the position that the Westfall Act was intended to include as
"employees" individuals such as those serving as mediators in the Court's
current program. As a general rule, in order to be considered a government
employee for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Government
must control the day-to-day physical performance of the individual's work.
Therefore, although we will appropriately provide representation, we cannot
provide assurances that the Attorney General would seek to invoke the
Westfall Act in any suit against a mediator.
I hope that this letter responds to the Court's concerns. I and other
representatives from the Civil Division would be pleased to discuss this
matter further with you and/or the Circuit Executive if you think it would
be helpful.
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Sincerely,
/s/
STEPHEN C. BRANSDORFER
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Civil Division
cc: Linda Finkelstein
Circuit Executive
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit
333 Constitution Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20001-2866
William R. Burchill, Jr.
General Counsel
Administrative Office of the
United States Courts
Washington, DC 20544
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Memorandum
DATE: July 17, 1992
TO: Volunteer Court Mediators
FROM: Hon. Robert W. Sweet
SUBJECT: Mediator Protection
During the Mediator training sessions of June 22nd and 23rd 1992,
direction was sought from the Court as to individual volunteer mediator
protection: What protection does a volunteer mediator have if sued for
actions which have taken place during the mediation process?
As you may be aware, other Appeals and District Courts have and
will be implementing mediation programs similar to our program. Prior to
establishment of a mediation program by the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit and the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia advice and guidance was sought from the General
Counsel of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and the
United States Department of Justice Attorney General Civil Division as to
the availability of legal representation and protection for volunteer
mediators. Attached you will find letters dated November 15, 1990 from
William R. Burchill, Jr. General Counsel Administrative Office of the
United States Courts and March 13, 1991 from Stephen C. Bransdorfer,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Civil Division addressing the issue of
mediator representation and protection.
While each letter speaks for itself, I believe that it would be fair to
state that each office would be sensitive to the equities in favor of defending
mediators who are assisting the courts in the performance of an official
function. While it appears that representation generally would be available,
it cannot actually be authorized until such time as suit arises and each office
is able to review the nature of the suit and the mediator's involvement.
Court staff has been in recent contact with each office and
confirmed that the positions stated in the letters remain in force and effect.
The advisory group appointed by the Court under the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990 takes the position that a person serving as a volunteer
mediator and acting under an order of a Judge of this Court would be
entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity as are other governmental
officials who play an integral part in the implementation of the judicial
function. While there is no authority directly on point granting a Mediator
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absolute quasi-judicial immunity the advisory group believes there are
sufficient decisions covering other officials to support its position. The
advisory group directs your attention to the following cases.
Butz et al. v. Economou et al., 438 U.S. 478, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 57 L. Ed. 2d
895 (1978).
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S. Ct. 984, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128
(1976).
Barr v. Matteo et al., 360 U.S. 564, 79 S. Ct. 1335, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1434
(1959).
Antoine v. Byers & Anderson. Inc. et al., 950 F. 2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1991).
Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada et al., 828 F. 2d
1385 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1040, 100 L. Ed. 2d 616, 108
S. Ct. 2031 (1988).
Sharma v. Stevas, 790 F. 2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1986).
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America and its Local 656 and 985, et al.,
Greyhound Lines, Inc., et al., 701 F. 2d 1181 (6th Cir. 1983).
Marcedes v. Barrett, 453 F. 2d 391 (3d Cir. 1971).
Henig v. Odorioso, 385 F. 2d 491, (3d Cir. 1967) cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1016, 88 S. Ct. 1269, 20 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1968).
Bavers v. Heisel, 361 F. 2d 581, (3d Cir. 1966) (en banc) (collecting
cases), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021, 87 S. Ct. 1367, 18 L. Ed. 2d 457
(1967).
Raitport v. Provident National Bank, 451 F. Supp. 522 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
This Court hopes that this memorandum answers the question
raised in regard to volunteer mediator's protection. We again thank you for
your participation. In the near future you will receive your initial
assignment. We look forward to working with each of you.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
APPENDIX E
State Statutes or Court Rules Addressing Mediator Immunity and/or
Compensation 1
99
Alabama. ALA. Crv. CT. MEDIATION R. 15(b) (mediators set their own
fees). Mediation standards for court-annexed programs are under
consideration. Ala. Order 96-1, Adoption of the Alabama Code of Ethics
for Mediators, Dec. 14, 1995 (Alabama Supreme Court's Commission on
Dispute Resolution).
Alaska. ALASKA STAT. section 25.20.080(e) (mediators are paid by the
parties, although pro-bono services are available).
Arizona. ARIz. REV. STAT. section 12-223.08 deals with mediator liability
under community punishment program. Arizona Dispute Resolution
Association is preparing mediator selection and training standards for
adoption by the Arizona Supreme Court. Peter S. Chantilis, "Mediation
U.S.A.," 26 U. MemphisL. Rev. 1031, 1037-38 (1996).
California. CAL. CODE section 1297.432 (West Supp. 1994), provides
mediators with immunity within the scope of their duties.
Colorado. COLO. REv. STAT. section 13-22-305(6) (Supp. 1993), limits
liability to willful or wanton misconduct. Compensated mediators are hired
by the Office of Dispute Resolution, which administers ADR programs
statewide. COLO. REv. STAT. section 13-22-303 (1989 & Supp. 1995).
Connecticut. CONN. GEN. STAT. section. 5.141(d) (1988), provides for no
liability within the scope of employment, except for reckless or malicious
conduct.
Florida. FLA. STAT. ANN. section 44.107 (West Supp. 1995), grants
mediators immunity equivalent to judicial immunity. Fla. Stat. Ann.,
section 44.201(6) (West Supp. 1995) provides mediator immunity when as
mediator at citizen dispute settlement centers. Fla. Stat. Ann., section
627.7015(5) (West Supp. 1995) provides mediator immunity in insurance
mediation. Mediators are either paid a salary, an hourly rate set by the court
199 See generally NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, Poucy,
PRACTICE App. B (2d ed. 1994); American Bar Association, Standing Committee on Dispute
Resolution, STATE LEGISLATION ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1988).
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or by the parties. Peter S. Chantillis, Mediation U.S.A., 26 U. MEMPHIS L.
REv. 1031, 1047 (1996). See generally J. Sue Richardson, Mediation: The
Florida Legislature Grants Judicial Immunity to Court-Appointed
Mediators, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 623 (1990).
Georgia. SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION RULES Rule 6.2 (March 9, 1993) established by court order
immunity for all neutrals participating in a court-annexed or court-referred
program. Courts may set hourly rates to compensate non-volunteer
mediators. GA. CODE ANN. section 15-23-11 (1994).
Hawaii. HAW. REV. STAT. section 672-9 (1985), protects against liability
for libel, slander or other defamation of character for members of the design
professional conciliation panel, a special mediation panel. A sliding scale
based on the disputants' ability to pay fixes compensation for mediators.
Haw. R. Cir. Ct., Exh. A.
Idaho. IDAHO R. Civ. P. 507 provides mediator privilege for confidential
communications made during the course of mediation.
Illinois. ILL. REv. STAT. 20/6 section 6 (1992). Confidentiality for all
memoranda, work products and case files for mediation pursuant to the Not-
for-Profit Dispute Resolution Center Act.
Indiana. IND. R. A.D.R. Rule 7 (1995) prohibits contingency or result fees
to mediators.
Iowa. IOWA CODE section 679.13 (West 1987), provides immunity to
mediators. IOWA CODE section 13.16(1) (West 1994), protects against civil
damages in farmer-lender mediation. Excluded under both statutes are acts
in bad faith, with malicious purpose or demonstrating willful and wanton
disregard of human rights, safety or property. Mediators in civil cases are
compensated. IOWA CODE section 679A. 10 (West 1987).
Kansas. KAN. STAT. section 5-513 deals with mediator liability. Bill is
pending concerning mediator confidentiality to implement the Dispute
Resolution Act. Peter S. Chantillis, Mediation U.S.A., 26 U. MEMPHIS L.
REV. 1031, 1055 (1996).
Kentucky. KY. REV. STAT. section 64.310 (Baldwin 1993); Ky. Rev. Stat.
section417.140 (Baldwin 1993). Non-volunteer mediators are compensated
based on the adjusted gross income of the parties.
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Louisiana. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 40, section 1299.47(H) (West Supp.
1993), provides immunity for members of medical-claim conciliation panels
within the scope of their duties.
Maine. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.4, section 18(2-A) (West 1988), provides
mediators, within the scope of their duties, with immunity equivalent to that
of other governmental employees. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., tit. 19, section
1752(4) (West 1964 & Supp. 1995) authorizes use of compensated
mediators.
Minnesota. MINN. STAT. ANN. section 583.26(7) (West 1988), repealed
7/1/95, formerly provided immunity within the scope of farm-lender
mediation services. MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114.11, mediators negotiate the
amount of their compensation with the disputants.
Mississippi. MIss. CODE ANN. section 69-2-49 (Supp. 1988), provides
immunity within the scope of farm-debt mediation services. The Mississippi
Center for Dispute Resolution was established as a program for voluntary
mediation under the auspices of the New Orleans Office of the American
Arbitration Association. When used, a mediator fee of $100 per hour is
divided among the parties. Peter S. Chantillis, Mediation U.S.A., 26 U.
MEMPHIS L. REV. 1031, 1062 (1996).
Montana. MONT. CODE ANN. section 27-6-106 (1987), provides absolute
immunity for medical malpractice mediators within the scope of their
duties.
Nebraska. NEB. REV. STAT. section 44-2844(3), provides absolute
immunity for members of medical-claim conciliation panels within the scope
of their duties. Neb. Rev. Stat., section 25-2913, the Dispute Resolution
Act established the Office of Dispute Resolution, which compensates non-
volunteer mediators. Neb. Rev. Stat., section 48-168 deals with mediator
liability.
Nevada. NEV. REV. STAT. section 630.364 (1993), provides immunity,
absent malicious intent, for medical panel members. Nev. Arb. R. 24
provides for the compensation of mediators at $75 per hour, capping fees at
$500 per case.
New Jersey. N.J. STAT. ANN. section 2A:23A-9(c)(d) (West 1987),
provides immunity for dispute resolution umpires, absent specified
wrongful conduct.
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New York. N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW section 2974 (McKinney's 1996)
deals with mediator liability.
North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT. section 7A-38(j) (Supp. 1994), provides
absolute judicial immunity to mediators; N.C. Gen. Stat., Secs. 1-539.10 to
1-539.11 (Supp. 1988), provide qualified immunity for uninsured volunteer
mediators serving with uninsured nonprofit charitable organizations. N.C.
Gen. Stat., section 150B-23.1 (Supp. 1994), provides absolute judicial
immunity to mediators assisting administrative agency mediation.
North Dakota. N.D. CENT. CODE section 6-09.10-04.1 (1993), provides
immunity for mediators in farmers debt mediation services.
Ohio. OHIO MUN. CT. Sup. R. Rule 15, provides for court-annexed
mediation, primarily in small claims courts with cases involving $5,000 or
less, in which mediators are compensated by the parties.
Oklahoma. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, section 1805(E) (West Supp. 1989),
provides immunity, absent willful conduct. Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 59,
section 328.63 (West Supp. 1989), provides immunity under dental
mediation program.
Oregon. OR. REV. STAT. section 36.210 (Supp. 1994), provides qualifiedimmunity to mediators.
Rhode Island. R.I. GEN. LAWS section 9-19-44 (Supp. 1995), protects the
confidentiality and nondisclosure of mediator work product.
South Carolina. S.C. CODE ANN. section20-7-420(39) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1995). Mediators set their own fees under the family mediation statute.
South Dakota. S.D. CODE ANN. section 54-13-20 provides immunity for
mediators assisting Farm Mediation Board.
Tennessee. TENN. CODE ANN. section 16-20-105 (1994), provides qualified
immunity to mediators in court-annexed mediation programs.
Texas. TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. sections 154.002-154.003
(West Supp. 1996), provides court-annexed mediation in all courts and for
all cases and addresses mediator liability. Mediators are paid by the parties
and the payments are taxable court costs.
Utah. UTAH CODE ANN. section 78-14-15 (1992), provides immunity,
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absent willful conduct; UTAH ADMIN. R. 4.510(12), provides for payment
of mediators by the parties except in cases where such payment results in
financial hardship.
Vermont. VT. STAT ANN. Tit. 16 section 2007(e)(1982), provides for
shared payment to mediators in teacher labor disputes by the parties.
Virginia. VA. CODE ANN. section 8.01-581.23 (Michie Supp. 1988),
provides mediators serving in court-annexed mediation programs with
qualified immunity within the scope of their duties, absent bad faith or
willful conduct. Mediators in private disputes set their own fees. Minimal
per-case fees are fixed by contract with the court system; court service units
and departments of social services set fees on a sliding scale. Peter S.
Chantillis, "Mediation U.S.A.," 26 U. MEMPHIS L. REv. 1031, 1078-79
(1996).
Washington. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. section 7.75.100 (West Supp.
1989), provides qualified immunity to dispute resolution center directors,
employees and mediators acting in good faith, except in cases of willful or
wanton misconduct. Mediation of family law issues at the community level
is publicly funded. Peter S. Chantillis, Mediation U.S.A., 26 U. MEMPHIS
L. REV. 1031, 1080 (1996).
West Virginia. W.V. CODE section 23-5-1 provides immunity for
mediators resolving disputes over medical treatment.
Wisconsin. Wis. STAT. ANN. section 93.50(2)(c) (West Supp. 1988),
provides qualified immunity to dispute resolution center directors and
mediators acting in good faith to resolve disputes over farm debts. Wis.
Stat. Ann., section 665.42-.68 (West 1985) authorizes the use of mediation
panels to resolve medical malpractice disputes and provides mediator
immunity from civil liability. Wis. Stat. Ann., section 218.01(71) (West
Supp. 1988) grants immunity to mediators resolving motor vehicle finance
disputes. See generally Daniel A. Noonan & Judith M. Bostetter,
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Wisconsin: A Court Referral System, 78
MARQ. L. REV. 609 (1995).
Wyoming. WYO. STAT. section 11-41-105 (Supp. 1993), provides
mediators within the Agriculture Mediation Service immunity for good-faith
acts or omissions within the scope of their duties. Wyo. R. Civ. P. 40(D),
authorizes a minimum payment of $50 per hour for mediators from state
funds.
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